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THE EFFECT OF NCLB ON STATE BOARD AND LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD 
RELATIONS:  
A PENNSYLVANIA EXAMPLE 
Joseph J. Dietrich, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
The political environment created by the high expectation for educational systems by voters, 
coupled with the requirements of federal legislation, and the political gains to be made by 
educational reform politicians exert a downward pressure on local school boards. As a result, 
school boards are being isolated from the local control that they have traditionally enjoyed. 
Federal efforts such as NCLB have required state bureaucratic reforms demanding higher levels 
of conformity with centralized state education policy in many jurisdictions. As a result, school 
boards may no longer be the representatives of local control but simply the administrators of 
state policy at a local level. 
This qualitative study investigates whether a set of school boards in Pennsylvania is 
losing traditional autonomy and how this may be occurring. Using a critical case study design, 
the relationship between local school boards in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and the 
Pennsylvania State Board of Education (PSBE) is considered in relation to principal agent theory 
(PAT). PAT is a widely used theory in the social sciences that provides a basic framework for 
 iv 
investigating the role of individual and organizational interests, information flows, and 
incentives in governance settings. Data was collected by interview and sorted by codes based on 
an a priori content analysis. These codes were then combined to create themes from which the 
interplay of the relationship between the PSBE and the local school boards can be examined. 
The key finding of this study supports the idea that Pennsylvania is centralizing authority 
over education. However, local school boards are also maintaining a high degree of local control 
as the implementation of state policy has generally been left to the local boards. Findings 
indicate that those involved in the study feel that state standards and the prescribed Annual 
Yearly Progress goals have been a positive influence in Pennsylvania. Additional findings of this 
study are that authority over education in Pennsylvania is more broadly distributed among the 
state government than expected. This study also provides a policy recommendation that the role 
of local school boards be reviewed as their function in the new centralized policy environment 
lacks definition.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The current political environment in education exerts extreme pressure on school boards to make 
decisions that both placate and adequately serve the local citizens they represent as well as the 
legislators who fund them. However, school boards are increasingly being isolated from the 
autonomy and power that they have traditionally enjoyed (Murphy, 1990; Wirt & Kirst, 1997). 
More recent federal legislation, such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, has not addressed 
the role of the local school boards, but it has defined how states are to educate children by tying 
testing results to funding. The consequence of these federal efforts in many local jurisdictions 
has been a more active and involved state bureaucracy demanding higher levels of conformity 
with state-derived policy flowing from federal mandates. These efforts on the part of the state, 
whether intended or not, represent a push towards centralized state education policy. In this type 
of system, the school boards are seen as the administrators of state policy at a local level. They 
are empowered by and responsible in terms of the decisions that need to be made but often lack 
the capacity to make actual decisions because true authority over the schools has been 
centralized to the state and its agencies. 
The principal agent theory (PAT) provides a basic framework for investigating the role of 
individual and organizational interests, information flows, and incentives in administrative and 
governance settings. It focuses on the relationships between entities and can be used to 
understand the motivations behind the activities of actors within hierarchical and contractual 
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relationships (Stiglitz, 1987). Put briefly, PAT allows researchers the opportunity to define and 
describe the power relationship that exists between two parties, a superior (the principal) and a 
subordinate (the agent), bound by a contract. The major assumption of the theory is that the 
interests of the principal and the agent will not always align and thus create a circumstance 
where the agent will follow their own interest in violation of their agreement. As such, 
mechanisms of control must be employed to keep the agent aligned with the principal. It has 
been used many times by political theorists to describe the bureaucratic relationship that exists in 
a governance context. Recently, several researchers have started to apply the theory to 
educational governance settings (Lane, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008). As such, it is fundamental 
to the work described here.  
1.1 CONTEXT AND PROBLEM 
As states continue their push to implement standards, it is becoming increasingly clear that this 
movement presents local school districts with a variety of challenges. According to the 
Pennsylvania School Boards Association, prominent among these challenges is the topic of local 
autonomy and the degree to which states should be able to dictate issues such as curriculum, 
teaching methods, and graduation requirements to local authorities. The states, themselves, are 
under increasing pressure from the federal government to increase achievement among students. 
This, in turn, results in the states increasing pressure on local school districts for better results. In 
most jurisdictions, dictates that closely resemble federal mandates are handed down from the 
state to be implemented at the local district level (PSBA, 2003).  
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In Pennsylvania, there is a strong tradition of local control in which the 500 local school 
boards traditionally make curriculum and administrative decisions based on limited and 
generalized dictates from the state. It is the board’s job to turn an eye towards the desires of the 
community they serve while ensuring that the local district meets or exceeds the basic 
educational requirements suggested by the Pennsylvania Department of Education Bureau 
of Assessment & Accountability (PSBA, 2007). However, the increased push for statewide 
homogenization in Pennsylvania calls this traditional role into question. Hence, the general 
question addressed in this study is “Are school boards in Pennsylvania losing autonomous local 
control over curriculum and administrative decisions?”. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
How does NCLB influence the relationship between the Pennsylvania State Board of 
Education and local school board autonomy? 
This study is essentially a look at the oversight of the power structures in American public 
education. School boards, in most of the United States, are traditionally responsible for the local 
decisions regarding public education. They have traditionally held sway over textbook choice, 
teacher and administration hiring and dismissal, local taxation, and who among the public has 
access to the school building. In many ways, the school board is the gatekeeper of the school; 
deciding who or what can enter the building.  
Despite their keystone placement at the heart of almost every American school district, 
very little work has been done to clearly define their roles, examine their power and its source, 
and study the relationship that exists between the state and the board. This dissertation is an 
14 
attempt to address this gap in the literature. Pennsylvania provides an example of the modern 
trend of centralization in education that is common across several states in the middle Atlantic 
and New England regions. With a strong tradition of local control and a typically “hands-off” 
style of administration from the state, Pennsylvania provides a unique opportunity to examine 
how the new environment in education is changing the relationship between the board and the 
state. 
A review of the political structures that exist in education reveals a significant amount of 
literature that focuses on either the relationship between the student and the teacher or the 
teacher and the administration. These three groups receive the bulk of attention by those with an 
interest in power and governance. Many researchers are examining these groups as individual 
entities as well as the relationships that exist between them. There is work being done on the 
effect of political policy decisions, most notably the “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) legislation 
of 2001, on these groups and their relationships. This has spawned increasing research on the 
role that states play in policy making and delivering education. This, in turn, has generated new 
research into the relationship between the states and the federal department of education. It 
would seem then that every aspect of governance over the educational systems of America is 
being examined. However, the research indicates that there is a lack of work being done with 
regard to the role that school boards play in the educational process.  
School boards in most of the United States are responsible for the local decisions 
regarding public education. They are legally constituted entities whose sole purpose is to provide 
for the instruction of all youth living in their jurisdiction. They are the embodiment of the local 
control of education; an idea long sacrosanct in America. Given the current policy environment 
created by NCLB, one in which local jurisdictions are wholly accountable to states who are in 
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turn accountable to the federal government for continued funding, the role school boards play in 
the process would seem to be not only topical but of critical importance in understanding the 
current education policy environment.  
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2.0  LEGAL OVERSIGHT OVER EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 
2.1 LEGAL OVERSIGHT AND AUTHORITY IN CONTEXT 
Prior to the study presented in this research, neither the oversight role of Pennsylvania’s school 
boards nor their place in the political power structure regulating public schools had been 
researched as a singular case. However, as discussed in the review of the literature, there is 
research at a national level that discusses the power relationships and legal requirements that 
exist over boards of education. There is also some limited research on the political culture of 
local control in Pennsylvania (Fuhrman, 1989). To varying degrees, each branch of state 
government asserts some level of control over the educational process with local school boards at 
the bottom of the power hierarchy. However, all states have the constitutional authority to create 
and administer schools in their jurisdiction. As such, the research and literature from a national 
context is instructive in all state jurisdictions. 
The legal grounds for state control of education are based on precedents set early in our 
nation’s development. Education is not mentioned in any part of the U.S. Constitution. This 
silence devolves authority over education to the States via the Tenth Amendment which states 
that, “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states, are reserved to the states respectively…” While the U.S. Congress must find constitutional 
authority for every foray into educational policymaking, a state legislature, which by default is 
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seen as having authority over educational matters, may enact any educational legislation not 
forbidden by preexisting law.  
All the state constitutions provide positive authority for the existence of some educational 
apparatus in the state. Oversight authority is usually given to the legislature who has the 
authority to delegate administrative, but not legislative, authority to other state entities. 
Generally, the legislature looks primarily to a chief school officer and a state school board for the 
administration of education in the state. Given that the legislature has this oversight authority, as 
well as authority over state finances, they clearly have paramount authority over education in 
most U.S. jurisdictions. For the most part, Governors are isolated from direct authority over 
schools but do wield considerable influence through their appointment authority. 
2.2 THE POWER STRUCTURE SURROUNDING PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOLS 
2.2.1 The Legislature 
Constitutional and statutory language, court interpretations, and long practice make it clear that 
the legislature of each state is the ultimate authority on or about school policy and 
administration. The major decisions regarding education cannot be made anywhere else in the 
governmental structure. In Pennsylvania, this is most clearly evidenced by the inclusion of the 
federally mandated standards in education in the Pennsylvania Code (22 Pa. Code § 4.12). The 
Code is under the sole purview of the state General Assembly. State boards of education exert 
considerable influence and do have substantial administrative roles in most jurisdictions, but 
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whatever power they do have regarding education, it is a power that has devolved from the 
legislature.  
Most state constitutions contain language whereby the state legislature is charged with 
the responsibility of establishing and maintaining a system of free public schools. In the 
Pennsylvania Constitution the provision reads: “The General Assembly shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the 
needs of the Commonwealth.” (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2008). The state courts have 
consistently interpreted such language as ascribing plenary power over education to the 
legislature. The Free School Act of 1834 establishes the right of the state legislature to create 
school districts and devolves administrative authority over these municipal jurisdictions to 
school boards that will oversee them. The powers of school boards, the duly appointed delegates 
of the legislature regarding education, may be enlarged, diminished, modified or revoked, and 
their acts set aside or confirmed, at pleasure of the legislature. It can therefore be argued that 
while the ultimate authority for schools rests with the General Assembly, they have given their 
administrative, but not legislative, authority to other state entities (Pennsylvania Department of 
Education (PDE), The State Board of Education, and local school districts). 
2.2.2 The Governor and the Department of Education 
Traditionally, the direct role of the Governor over education in Pennsylvania has been limited to 
the appointment of the chief state school officer (currently the Secretary of Education), members 
of the state board of education, the staff of the state department of education, and other minor 
state committees concerned with school governance. The governor has no active role in the 
administration of schools in the state. However, as the chief executive with appointment power 
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over state agencies, the governor has, to varying degrees in each state, the ability to appoint or 
hire a significant number of people inside the state education agency, thus affording him or her 
the opportunity to firmly plant an agenda inside the organization. They also have the ability to 
use the position to make their educational agenda part of the legislative discussion. This ability 
depends on a number of factors and can only been seen as a positive power in states where a 
Governor welds a substantial amount of authority (Campbell, 1985).  
The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE), an executive agency of the Governor, 
gets its formal authority under an 1837 law that created a statewide Department of Schools with 
a Superintendent of Common Schools as its chief officer. The agency has evolved through 
several iterations to become the Department of Education. Its current mission is to “assist the 
General Assembly, the Governor, the Secretary of Education and Pennsylvania educators in 
providing for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of education” (PA 
Department of Education, 2008). The department maintains a dual role as advisor to the 
Governor, State Board of Education, and General Assembly on matters of educational policy and 
as the administrator of state policy regarding education. It has unusually broad authority over 
diverse matters such as teacher preparation and certification, assessment and accountability of 
students, provision of special education, colleges and universities, and adult literacy. Through its 
Bureau of Assessment and Accountability, PDE is responsible for the design and implementation 
of the state’s accountability system required under NCLB. However, those standards must be 
submitted to the State Board of Education for approval as per 24 P.S. § 26-2603-B (10)(i) of the 
Pennsylvania Statutes.  
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2.2.3 The Secretary of Education and the State School Board 
Every state has a chief school officer who is responsible for the oversight and distribution of 
education in that state. They serve as the head of the administrative office of the state regarding 
schools, usually the state department of education. Across the country, 14 of these officials are 
elected by direct popular vote, 24 are appointed by the state board of education, and 12 are 
appointed by the governor, as is the case in Pennsylvania (NASBE, 2009). Article IV section 8 
of the state constitution specifically requires the appointment of a Secretary of Education by the 
Governor to oversee the Department of Education created by the Free Schools Act and its 
descendent legislation. In all jurisdictions across the country, the chief state school officer is 
legally an officer of the state but in most cases is not directly accountable to the Governor either 
because the office has been politically isolated by statute or the Governor is not involved in their 
selection. This is not true in Pennsylvania where the Secretary of Education serves at the 
pleasure of the Governor and can be removed from his or her position at the Governor’s request.  
Table 1. Chief Schools Officer Selection Method 
State Boards of Education Appointed Chief 
Schools Officer  24 
AK, AL, AR, CT, CO, FL, HI, IL, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, MI, 
MO, MS, NY, NB, NV, OH, RI, UT, VT, WV  
Elected Chief Schools Officer 14 AZ, CA, GA, ID, IN, MT, NC, ND, OK, OR, SC, WA, WI, WY 
Governor Appointed Chief Schools Officer 12 DE, IA, ME, NH, NJ, NM, MN, PA, SD, TN, TX, VA 
*adapted from National Association of School Boards of Education data (NASBE, 2009) 
Regardless of how they arrive at their position and the title they are given, chief state 
school officers exercise considerable influence over education at all levels in their respective 
states. This official is usually charged by statute to exercise general supervision over the schools 
of the state, to organize a staff of professionals in the state department of education, and to direct 
the operation of certain special schools, such as those for the deaf and the blind, which are often 
under state jurisdiction. In most cases, they are also responsible for the oversight of institutions 
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of higher education in the state. The chief state school officer influences state policy for 
education by giving public expression to educational needs of the state by enlisting grassroots 
support among teacher unions, administrators and interested parties, by directly recommending 
action to the state board of education, and by advising the legislature and the Governor as they 
consider educational policy directions. 
Forty-eight states have a state board of education. Wisconsin and Minnesota are the only 
exceptions (NASBE, 2009). State boards of education are administrative agencies usually 
charged with exercising general control over the elementary and secondary schools of the state. 
Most state boards, 35 in total, are appointed by the Governor through some process while 10 
state boards are elected by popular ballot (NASBE, 2009). Two states, South Carolina and New 
York give the state legislature the authority to appoint the state board of education. State boards 
are usually composed of from five to nine members who are knowledgeable in education or state 
policy in general. In many cases, state school boards are at least partially composed of state 
officials who carry other titles. They generally serve without pay (which is why government 
officials can serve on them) but are allowed expenses for travel to meetings. Boards are often 
seen as having some policymaking function regarding education, but in reality they generally 
represent the policy goals of the Governor and the chief school officer.  
Table 2. State Board of Education Selection Method 
Governor Appointed State Boards of 
Education  
35 AK, AZ, AR, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, IN, KY, LA, 
MA, MD, ME, MO, MT, NC, ND, NH, NJ, OH, OK, OR, PA, 
RI, SD, TN, VA, VT, WA, WV, WY 
Elected State Boards of Education 10 AL, CO, HI, KS, MI, NB, NV, UT, TX, NM 
Legislature Appointed State Boards of 
Education  
2 NY, SC 
Other 3 MN, MS (board appointed by gov., lt. gov, and leg.), WI 
*adapted from National Association of School Boards of Education data (NASBE, 2009) 
In the case of Pennsylvania, the State Board of Education has 22 members who serve in 6 
year terms which can, and often do, exceed the administration which appointed them. 17 
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members are appointed by the Governor and require Senate approval. The Secretary of 
Education is also a member and serves as the chief executive officer of the Board. The remaining 
four members of the Board are the currently serving majority and minority chairmen of the 
House and Senate Education Committees. This arrangement gives the Governor considerable 
power over educational policy in the state via appointments to the State Board. The Board was 
created in its current form in 1963. It is divided into two Councils, the Council of Basic 
Education and the Council of Higher Education, with each Council having 10 members. In their 
respective milieu, each Council is the chief arbiter with regard to educational policy in the state 
(PA Department of Education, 2008). 
For the majority of states, the sovereignty of the state over education is usually held by 
the state board of education. It can be argued that Pennsylvania is an exception with the ultimate 
authority resting with the General Assembly; however the State Board of Education has been 
mandated by the legislature to “adopt broad policies and principles, and establish standards 
governing the educational program of the Commonwealth” (24 P.S. § 26-2603-B (a)) 
(Pennsylvania Statutes, 2008). They are the appointed policy makers in Pennsylvania regarding 
education. The State Board has oversight authority over the creation or reconstitution of school 
districts. It has the responsibility to adopt master plans for basic and higher education policies 
within the state. It also is the custodian of the State School Fund which gives it authority to apply 
for and administer Federal educational grants, appropriations, allocations and programs. As 
previously stated, the function of the State Board of Education is divided into two Councils with 
distinct jurisdiction over higher education and basic education. As defined by the State Board 
itself:  
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The Council of Basic Education has the power and duty to develop a master plan for 
basic education in the Commonwealth for adoption by the board; investigate programs, 
conduct research studies and formulate policy programs in all educational areas not 
within the purview of higher education; encourage and promote such agricultural, 
industrial, vocational and technical education programs as the needs of this 
Commonwealth may require; and investigate and make recommendations pertaining to 
the work of any schools of design, schools of industrial arts or industrial schools to which 
the General Assembly may make an appropriation. (PA Department of Education, 2008)  
 
The State Board of Education occupies an odd place within the administration of 
educational policy in Pennsylvania. It is chartered by the General Assembly and given the power 
to “review and adopt regulations” that pertain to education in the state. However, it is constituted 
under the Department of Education which also has its own authority to review and adopt 
regulations that pertain to education. Furthermore, the Secretary of Education is the chief 
executive officer of the State Board as well as a member of the Governor’s cabinet. Title 24 
Chapter 1 Article XXVI (B) of the Pennsylvania Statutes speaks directly to the jurisdictional 
overlap that may occur between PDE and the State Board saying: 
 
Statements of policy, standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the board shall be 
binding upon the Department of Education. The department shall submit to the board for 
approval, modification or rejection, all rules and regulations proposed by the department 
in the areas under the control of the board. The Department of Education shall furnish 
upon request of the board such data and information as the board may, from time to time, 
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require, and the department shall provide administrative services for and on behalf of the 
board for the implementation of the board's statements of policy, standards, rules and 
regulations. 
 
The language of the statute makes it clear that the State Board of Education is the authority over 
school policy in Pennsylvania with its power being derived via legislative devolution.  
2.2.4 School Districts 
School districts in Pennsylvania are constituted under the Free Schools Act of 1834. This act 
effectively turned every ward, borough, and township into a school district responsible for 
providing free elementary education to the young citizens of that district. According to Donald 
Kent of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, a total of 1489 school districts 
were created by the act (Kent, 1976). Although any district could opt out of the provisions of the 
1834 legislation, most did not. As the state grew, so did the number of townships and boroughs 
and their school districts. The Pennsylvania School Boards Association (PSBA) cites 2599 
school districts operating in Pennsylvania in 1910. By 1960, the number had been reduced to 
2277 (PSBA, 2009). Post reports that by 1963 the number had dropped to 2056 school districts 
based on a 1961 legislative action (Post & Stambach, 1999). A 1963 law and a 1968 law, Act 
299 and 150 respectively, applied financial incentives to induce school districts within the state 
to consolidate (PSBA, 2009). However, each was met with harsh resistance in the local 
communities being induced to consolidate. The state effort resulted in reducing the number of 
school districts to 669 by 1970. PSBA again shows that by 1980 the number had been reduced by 
a further 164 districts bringing the total operating to 505 (PSBA, 2009). Federal involvement in 
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desegregation and diversification efforts in the 1980s and a recent consolidation effort in 2008 
(Center Township and Monaca) brings the current operating number of districts in Pennsylvania 
to 500.    
Despite all the efforts at consolidation in the state, at 499, Pennsylvania still has one of 
the highest numbers of school districts in the nation. Only 10 states have more districts. Four of 
those have significantly larger populations and all have more territory to administer. 
Pennsylvania averages one school district for every 24,600 citizens. More importantly, according 
to a recent publication from the governor’s office, 80% of the school districts in Pennsylvania 
serve student populations under 5,000 and 40% serve less than 2,000 (PDE, 2009). Given the 
ever increasing operating costs of school districts, Governor Edward Rendell proposed in 2009 to 
consolidate the districts again with the aim of having no more than 100 in the state. This 
initiative, like previous consolidation efforts, has been met with considerable resistance by 
teacher’s organizations, the Pennsylvania School Boards Association, newspapers, and local 
citizens. 
2.2.5 Local School Boards 
While the legislature, Governor, and state departments of education have much to do with the 
government of education, the responsibility for the actual operation of most of the public schools 
in the United States rests with the district boards of education. In general, a board of education is 
both a corporate body and a quasi-municipal corporation (similar to a county or a city) chartered 
by the state legislature. However, its authority is limited to the sole purpose of administering the 
state’s system of public education in a geographically defined region. They are mostly comprised 
of civic-minded, lay citizens rather than professional educators and administrators, who are 
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elected from the local jurisdiction. As elected officials, board members must carry out the 
mandates of the state but must also try to be responsive to the desires of local citizens. Local 
boards can determine policies involving contracts, raising funds via bond offerings, minimum 
standards, and the expenditure of funds, but they must also carry out specific state duties 
involving appointing personnel, accounting of district funds, record keeping, and following 
school calendars. In most cases, all operational powers of school boards are circumscribed in 
some fashion by state law. For example, state law nearly always stipulates that fund raising (via 
bonds) or expenditures for capital outlay are possible only after approval has been secured by a 
referendum in the district.  Local school boards are incorporated as bodies corporate under the 
Public Statutes of Pennsylvania (24 P.S. § 2-211).  
As previously stated, there has been no comprehensive examination of Pennsylvania and 
those who oversee the system of education. It therefore stands to reason that the legal and 
political relationships that exist between the state offices, which have authority over the system, 
and the local officials, who have been charged with its maintenance, has also never been 
comprehensively explored and defined. Chapter 2 has endeavored to outline the legal parameters 
that define these relationships and more clearly delineate the lines of legal authority in the 
system. However, for an exploration of the political relationships that exist in Pennsylvania’s 
public education governance system, a more formalized structure will be required for the 
analysis. As described in Chapter 3 of this research, the Principal Agent Framework has been 
selected as the primary analysis tool in exploring the political relationships in Pennsylvania 
public education. 
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3.0  THE PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY 
The principal agent theory (PAT) is based upon the relationship that exists between a principal 
who contracts with an agent to engage in specific actions that will elevate the status of the 
principal relative to the status quo (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz, 1987). The premise of the 
framework is that the principal does not have sufficient time, knowledge, or resources to 
satisfactorily fulfill their own needs. As a result, the principal contracts with an agent who 
ostensibly has the required resources to fill the needs of the principal. In this relationship, the 
agent is trusted to make decisions that are in the best interest of the principal. However, the self-
interests of the agent do not always align with the interests of the principal. This likely difference 
in preference requires that the principal provide incentives to ensure that the agent follows their 
wishes. It also requires that the principal monitor the actions of the agent to ensure satisfactory 
completion of the contract. 
This model assumes that all individuals prefer to pursue their own self-interest (agency) 
before the interest of others. The term shirking is used to describe the action of evading work or 
pursuing self-interested goals in lieu of the principal’s goals (Fiorina, 1982). Agents will 
ceaselessly act to shirk their work burden so long as the principal fails to react and punish the 
agent effectively (Frey, 1993). The existence of shirking requires the principal to ensure the 
agent acts in the best interest of the principal. This is particularly important since the agent’s 
specialized skills give the agent an advantage over the principal in using the principal’s resources 
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for their own benefit. This is the problem of asymmetrical information. The agent is privy to 
information that principal is not (thus the founding of the relationship) and can exploit this lack 
of information to shirk. As Moe (1984) states, ”The logic of the principal agent model… leads us 
to the issues at the heart of the contractual paradigm: issues of hierarchical control in the context 
of information asymmetry and conflict of interest.” Therefore, the principal must utilize an 
assortment of punitive (firing or demotion) and compensatory (pay raises or days off) 
inducements coupled with oversight to ensure that the agent continues to act in the best interest 
of the principal.  
Despite the presence of inducements, there is still no guarantee that the agent will act in 
the interest of the principal. When shirking does occur, the principal must institute a program to 
alter the actions of the agent. When shirking is verified by the principal, they must act to utilize 
or modify one of the previously mentioned inducements in an effort to force the agent to alter 
their actions (Lane, 2008). It is important to note that the fear of corrective action is in and of 
itself an inducement which may be sufficient to prevent or decrease shirking. Oversight is the 
key to the principal agent relationship. Without it, there is no means for the principal to ensure 
that the agent continues to act in the principal’s interest and there is no reason for the agent to not 
pursue his or her own interest.  
The principal agent framework can be divided into two distinct yet highly related subsets. 
Motivation and mode of control are the key factors in this differentiation. Both economic PAT 
and political science PAT constructions assume both the agent and the principal to be self-
motivated and thus choose the options that increase their individual utility (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Lane 2008). However, researchers have noted that in all economic applications of PAT, 
principals and agents are always set in opposition to one another by the existence of an explicit 
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contract that defines the parameters of the relationship, such as compensation or the work to be 
performed (Moe, 1990). Agents will seek to maximize the compensation that they receive for the 
least amount of work and principals will always seek to limit the amount of compensation that 
they offer for the maximum amount of work provided. Further, the agent is always seen as 
something that needs to be reigned in and refocused back to the wants and desires of the 
principal. Thus, modes of control become a primary target for inquiry as it becomes the 
principal’s responsibility to keep the agent from shirking.  
The nature of the relationship is different in a political science construction of PAT, as 
these relationships are defined by an implicit contract determined by power brokering, elections, 
favors, appointments, and interventions from powerful public and private citizens (Moe, 1990). 
Oversight is therefore both internal and external. The focus of the relationship is on creating a 
policy and a process for implementation in the public sphere (Davis et al., 1997; Waterman & 
Meier, 1998), not necessarily exerting agency. The principal and agent may or may not agree 
over policy and/or the process, but this does not affect the relationship as there is no competition. 
They are rarely, if ever, set in opposition. Political science PAT has developed a view of the 
structure of the principal agent relationship that includes less emphasis on incentives and 
deterrence and more on monitoring the outcomes of the process. As the nature of the relationship 
between the state board of education and local school boards is dominated by elections, 
appointments, and public and private interventions, it is the political science construction of PAT 
that will be utilized in the analysis proposed here. 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) attempt to characterize this interaction of government 
oversight mechanisms as “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Lane and Kivisto (2008) also make 
use of this example. In their conception, police patrols are direct and centralized oversight 
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methods that are in operation whether or not there is a belief that the agent is shirking. For school 
boards, these might include annual district budgets, reports to the state department of education 
on Adequate Yearly Progress, records of meetings, and any documents that are required to be 
submitted to state and federal officials. Fire alarms are passive, indirect oversight methods that 
require intervention from non-governmental actors and concerned parties who oversee the action 
of the bureaucracy and report to the principal when they believe shirking by the agent is 
occurring. For school boards, these might include PTO organizations, fiscal watchdogs, public 
meetings, voting records, and investigative reports by the press.  
3.1 PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY AND OVERSIGHT IN PENNSYLVANIA 
EDUCATION 
The State Board of Education is an odd outlier within the oversight structure of educational 
policy in Pennsylvania. It is chartered by the General Assembly and given the power to “review 
and adopt regulations” that pertain to education in the state. However, it is constituted under the 
Department of Education which also has its own authority to review and adopt regulations that 
pertain to education. In essence, it serves two masters. Title 24 Chapter 1 Article XXVI (B) of 
the Pennsylvania Statutes speaks directly to the jurisdictional overlap that may occur between 
PDE and the State Board saying: 
Statements of policy, standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the board shall be 
binding upon the Department of Education. The department shall submit to the board for 
approval, modification or rejection, all rules and regulations proposed by the department 
in the areas under the control of the board. The Department of Education shall furnish 
upon request of the board such data and information as the board may, from time to time, 
require, and the department shall provide administrative services for and on behalf of the 
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board for the implementation of the board's statements of policy, standards, rules and 
regulations. 
 
The language of the statute makes it clear that the State Board of Education is the authority over 
school policy in Pennsylvania (with its power being explained via legislative devolution). It is 
for this reason that in the construction of the principal/agent relationship utilized in this project, 
the principal is represented by the State Board. It is easy to also envision PDE being the 
principal, as it is responsible for implementing the policy decisions of the State Board. However, 
in constructing the question, it was important to go to the ultimate authority over educational 
policy for the definition of the principal. The relationships between the PDE, the State Board, 
and the General Assembly will be discussed at length in a later section.    
Defining the local school board in Pennsylvania as the agent in this construction is a far 
simpler task. The Free School Act of 1834 defines locally constituted school boards as the 
primary agents of delivery and administration over the educational system in Pennsylvania. They 
are charged with representing their communities’ beliefs and values in the operation of school 
districts while also implementing state and federal mandates regarding education. Although the 
system has been refined several times, such as reducing the number of districts statewide from 
2000 prior to 1949 to the present 500, school boards have remained the local voice for citizens 
concerned about the schools.  
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4.0  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter presents the current and relevant literature from political science, economics and 
education pertaining to authority, oversight, and the governance structures of public education 
with particular attention paid to the uses of principal agent theory. The first section describes the 
relationship between the state and local school boards. The second section describes how the 
principal agent theory has been applied in previous research. The final section outlines the roots 
and development of the principal agent theory.  
4.1 SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE STATE 
The body of academic work that explores the function and role of the public school board is 
dwarfed by similar literature covering the roles and functions of school administrators and the 
teaching faculty. As explored in section 4.1.1, it would seem that as the literature regarding the 
governance of schools has developed over the years, school boards have become a forgotten or 
ignored piece of the structure of education. Currently, the bulk of literature that does directly 
cover the functions of school boards tends to focus on administrative issues facing school boards 
as a whole in the form of “how-to” primers for board members or administrators. Literature of 
this nature generally lacks a deep systematic analysis of the state and federal context in which 
boards operate, which is critical to this research. Literature of this nature has not been discussed 
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in this research as better options for exploring the changing role of school boards in the 
governance structure of education exist, albeit in diverse areas and in limited quantities. 
While limited, some efforts have been made in the politics of education literature, as well 
as the state and local government literature in political science, to explore the political role of 
school boards or the political context in which they operate. The work of Cuban (2004), Wirt and 
Kirst (1972, 1982, 1997), Boyd (1976), Fuhrman (1989, 2001, 2004), Iannaconne and Lutz 
(1967, 1970, 1974) and others shows some attention has been paid to the school board over the 
last 40 years by education researchers. The politics of education literature on this subject can be 
divided further into literature that covers the politics of education with an emphasis on the states 
and literature that covers educational policy reform. However, as explored in section 4.1.2, the 
state politics of education literature is relatively new and has been evolving slowly. As a happy 
result, the research presented in this study does help to expand the state politics of education 
research. The educational policy reform literature comprises the bulk of work in the politics of 
education. While not necessarily taking a direct look at school boards or their members, this 
research has a profound effect on the board and its functions in the oversight of schools.   
4.1.1 Evolution and Eras of the Literature Pertaining to School Boards 
There are reasons why the school board has been generally overlooked, or at the very least, 
relegated to a diminished status by academics in the literature. Primarily, as reported in 
numerous studies (Jung & Kirst, 1989; Tyack in Hightower et al., 2002; Kirst in Epstein, 2004; 
McBeath et al. 2008; Fusarelli & Cooper, 2009), it has come as a result of the waning influence 
of local control that is perceived to have started in the 1970s and has left few of the traditional 
policy functions of the board intact. Local school boards still exercise considerable influence 
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over matters of school finance, but information on this subject is difficult to access given the 
great diversity and number of school districts in the United States. This has also left little for 
academics to study with regard to school boards. To put it another way, as state and federal 
power over education has grown since the 1970s, boards have become less important to the 
governance process. The focus of the research shifted to the state and, later, the federal 
authorities. It therefore stands to reason that as academics have focused their attention on these 
areas for research, the school board has become little more than a minor point of discussion.  
This study explores the literature pertaining to the function and politics of school boards 
in the United States through five eras of development. As discussed later in this chapter, the 
development of a literature surrounding school boards can most diplomatically be described as 
“messy.”  By dividing the literature on school boards into a catalogue of eras of development,  it 
allows for a more efficient discussion of the current context in which school boards operate. 
Issues that were hotly debated in the literature during the 1960s or 1970s may not be relevant 
today or, conversely, issues that previously passed by with little academic attention may now 
have developed into primary areas of exploration. Further, dividing the literature into eras allows 
this research to better isolate and highlight key points in the evolution of research on school 
board governance. The literature surrounding the areas key to this research can then be explored 
in more detail later in this chapter. Finally, it is also hoped that by taking this tack in exploring 
the literature that surrounds school boards, other researchers will be able to benefit from the 
particular order that this research creates.  
Each era is highly indicative of not only the issues of primacy in education at that time, 
but also of the status of local control and its representative in government, the local school board. 
The first era (pre-1965) predates the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and 
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includes literature that mostly reviews the functions of school boards in the governance structure 
of local districts (Cubberly, 1922; Reeves, 1954; Goldhammer 1964). This literature contains 
strong overtones of local authority and makes scarce reference to state and federal authority. The 
impetus for research in this era was to improve the function and efficiency of schools and was 
generally aimed at ways the local jurisdiction could improve.    
The second era (1965-1979) spans the time period between the ESEA in 1965 and the 
creation of the United States Department of Education in 1979 when state and federal authority 
over education was, as Cooper and Fusarelli (2009) describe, “ramping up.” The literature of this 
period is marked by a movement away from the school district or the school building as the 
focus of research and toward the newly minted power of the state in education. Iannaccone 
(1967), Iannaccone and Lutz (1970), Cistone (1975), Boyd (1976a) base their research in the 
district or on the school board, but the relationship with the state is a primary area of interest. 
There is also a strong concern for school finance reform and the state role in funding education. 
No doubt this is the result of the block grants to states created under the ESEA legislation and the 
rapid increase in the proportion of state and federal dollars used by local districts to fund their 
operation. There is also a strong interest in this literature in the role finances and the state and 
federal governments can play in increasing educational equity for traditionally marginalized 
groups.  
The third era (1982-1989) of literature is defined by the A Nation at Risk report released 
in 1983. After this report, the era of the broken school comes to define the research. Issues of 
funding equity and finance give way to declining test scores, rampant inequality, and reform 
oriented solutions to a general perception of failing public education. (Blumenfeld, 1984; Hunt, 
1986; Gatto, 1992; Kozol, 1992) Declining test scores are characterized as a loss in a global 
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competition for excellence in education among nations (Kearns & Doyle, 1988). This perception 
of loss breeds the emergence of centralization of authority over schools which begins to appear 
in the literature as states developed new plans for attacking the troubled schools and academics 
began to look at these plans and their effect. The status of urban schools becomes a separate 
literature which mirrors a trend in political science that focuses on failing urban governments 
(Cibulka et al., 1992). This era does, however, return some focus to the local districts and their 
boards as they are often characterized as incompetent, corrupt, and/or standing in the path of 
progress. 
The fourth era (1989-2001) of the literature pertaining to the school board is marked by 
the 1989 Education Summit held in Charlottesville, VA and the adoption of the National 
Education Goals for the Year 2000 document by the 50 state governors and then-President 
G.H.W. Bush. This is the first proclamation of the standards-based educational reforms that have 
come to dominate the literature on education in the modern era. Chubb and Moe (1990), 
Jennings (1998), Doyle and Pimentel (1999), Ohanian (1999), Kearns and Harvey (2000), Evers 
and Walberg (2002), and Fuller (2002) all reference assessments and considerations of federally-
led and state implemented standards-based solutions that define the literature of this era. Chubb 
and Moe, in their book Politics, Markets, and American Schools, have particularly influenced the 
thinking of policymakers on the use of standards-based solutions in reforming American public 
education. The literature of the politics of education also diverges into researchers who focus 
primarily on federal education efforts and those who focus mostly on the efforts of state based 
reforms. In either case, the tone of the literature marks a clear movement away from concern for 
local governance or local control. As with previous eras, local leaders, whether urban or rural, 
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are seen as part of the problem in the educational system. As a result, the superintendency and 
it’s role becomes a particular focus in this era.  
The fifth and final era (post-2001-present) of literature in this field is marked by the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001. The act is the final step in the standards-based reform movement 
in education to date. To some, it also marks the effective end of local control in public education 
as the state and federal authorities have the ultimate authority. Initially, the literature of this era 
regards NCLB with an incredible amount of skepticism and doubt (Fuhrman, 2001; Meier & 
Wood, 2004; Perlstein, 2007). However, the initial skepticism felt after the sweeping changes in 
2001 has eventually given way to a literature of assessment and predictions about the future of 
standards-based reforms and educational policy (Hess, 2004; McGuinn, 2006; Ravitch, 2010). 
Overall, it offers criticism and critique of the effect of the standards-based movement from the 
vantage point of most educational stakeholders (Petersen & West, 2003; Howell, 2005). Further, 
the literature notes a dramatic change in the direction of the educational policy goals enacted 
under ESEA that were designed to help those who were designated “special needs” such as 
special education, ESL, blacks, and the poor to achieve equity by targeting them with special aid. 
The literature notes a distinct difference in the policy goals for NCLB by introducing 
consequences for not increasing achievement regardless of need or equity. 
4.1.2 Development of the State Politics of Education Literature 
The state politics of education literature, like all literature in the politics of education, finds its 
roots intertwined with political science. In 1959, Eliot published “Toward An Understanding of 
Public School Politics” in the American Political Science Review. This was the first attempt by a 
political scientist to apply the theories of that discipline to the area of local educational 
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governance. As Coombs (1994) notes, others working in the field of educational administration 
had previously strayed into studies that would today be considered part of the politics of 
education cannon. However, there was no systematic approach to creating a body of literature on 
educational politics in either political science or education until the late 1960s and even those 
efforts were disorganized at best (Scribner et al., 2003). 
In fact, as Coombs (1994) and Scribner et al. (2003) note, the two disciplines traditionally 
have approached the subject from radically different vantage points and continue to do so. 
Research by those from the education discipline into the politics of education contains a strong 
affinity for concepts and assumptions from organizational theory. This is evidenced by the focus 
on improvement by analysis of organizational units (schools, classrooms, departments of 
education, etc…) in the educational process. Political science, for its part in the analysis of 
education, has generally focused on using theoretical approaches, such as the principal agent 
theory, that explore the interplay of relationships and interests in the field. For example, in their 
seminal 1972 book, The Political Web of American Schools, Wirt and Kirst, both political 
scientists, characterize schools as a web of interrelated needs and desires that are intertwined 
with various levels of authority, influence, and control. It is a decided departure from the 
educational literature of the day which focused mostly on the various components of the 
educational process. Scribner et al. (2003) note this disorganization and lack of a unified 
interdisciplinary approach and explore it as a hindrance to the development of the field today. 
Their research also includes an examination of a lack of unity to conceptual approach between 
researchers and practitioners, each of which has a different purpose in the field. They discuss 
these approaches as being incommensurable paradigms (theoretical vs. practical) which is a 
distinct problem for the field as a whole. 
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Mosher (1975), like Coombs, noted the relative newness of educational policy as a field 
of inquiry. She also notes at that time the lack of interstitial studies between education and 
political science on governance as would be expected given the variance in approach. Iannaccone 
& Cistone (1974), Kirst and Mosher (1969), Peterson (1974), and Wirt and Kirst (1972) all 
highlight a similar drought in interdisciplinary political science\education research in this time 
period. This provides evidence that the field of the politics of education began to coalesce in the 
time period between Eliot’s publication in 1959 and 1975. It also supports the idea that 
conceptual approach and research purpose have been an issue for the field for many years. In 
addition to those previously noted, Boyd (1976a), Cistone (1975), and Zeigler and Jennings 
(1974), among others, were also active in this time period building what would become the basis 
for the politics of education literature and, later, the state politics of education literature.  
McGivney (1989) in “State Educational Governance Patterns” states that a literature on 
state politics of education is limited and was only beginning to emerge in 1989, mimicking the 
sentiments expressed by Mosher fourteen years earlier. He also notes that while there is some 
new theory building occurring, the majority of the research being conducted on the state politics 
of education was in the form of state level descriptive studies exploring individual political 
cultures. He cites the work of educational researchers Bailey (1962), Usdan (1963), and Masters 
(1964) and their case study work in describing the political cultures in the Northeast and 
Midwest as being foundational to this field.  
Viteritti also indicates that very little attention had been paid to local governance 
structures in The End of Local Politics? (2005) by citing the last major research done on school 
boards was a 1986 Institute for Educational Leadership survey. This supports the idea that while 
the politics of education is a large and dynamic area of research in education, the state politics of 
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education, where this study specifically finds its home, traditionally has not been a robust area of 
research in any discipline. While there are numerous publications (Shea et al., 1989; Murphy, 
1990; Kearns & Harvey, 2000; Fuhrman, 2001; Howell, 2005, McGuinn, 2006) regarding 
educational reform efforts, few of these give more than a page to the discussion of the political 
relationships operating in education at the state level. They instead reserve their space for 
discussion of the relationships that exist between the board and superintendent, the district and 
community, the principal and teachers, and so on. 
As the research presented in this study finds itself clearly ingrained in the state politics of 
education literature, it is important to understand the history and development of this body of 
work. Despite its relative youth and being an offspring of the larger politics of education 
literature, the state politics of education has continued to develop as a body of literature in its 
own right. However, as discussed here, it still finds itself caught among the research techniques 
of multiple disciplines and lodged among the studies of disparate fields. It remains something of 
an unclaimed orphan in the politics of education and without a clear lineage to any one body of 
literature in the social sciences. While the initial perception of this interdisciplinary schism might 
seem problematic, it is this interdisciplinary nature that allows the research presented here to 
develop.  
4.1.3 The Idea of Local Control, Local School Boards and Administrators, and The State 
Governance Structure 
The work in the state politics of education has been limited, but there have been some efforts to 
define the political contexts for education in the various states. Generally, these efforts have 
focused on one of three areas: the idea of local control, local school boards and administrators, or 
the state governance structure. As would be expected, there is a high degree of overlap between 
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these areas in the research. For example, Herrington and Fowler (2003) explore the role that 
local control has traditionally played in state governance over education and document the 
emergence of state-level “special governance structures” (state boards, departments of education, 
and chief schools officers) for education. These structures were designed to protect the arena of 
public education from the influence of state politics. Herrington and Fowler (2003) then 
document the changes emerging from the federal level that have empowered the states with new 
authority over local jurisdictions weakening local control. They conclude the chapter with a 
discussion of the use of reforms and their effectiveness. They surmise that investment in research 
and development may hold more promise for positive changes in education than changes to the 
structure of governance over education. 
Fuhrman (1989) documents the state-level educational reform processes of six states and 
the transition into local policy. She bases much of the work on the importance of political 
context at all levels in a policy debate. As she suggests, the political beliefs and behaviors of a 
state have a deep effect on the translation of policy into practice at the local level. She is also one 
of the few authors to have looked at Pennsylvania specifically and defined its political culture as 
it pertains to education.  
In defining Pennsylvania, she notes the incremental approach that Pennsylvania has 
traditionally taken to educational reform and she highlights the loathing that many  
Pennsylvanians, including the politicians, feel when undertaking strong state-level initiatives. As 
she says, Pennsylvania considers itself to be a strong local control state. In her analysis, she 
assigns a great level of authority to the state board of education owing to their regulation power. 
As she observes, the political culture of the state prefers not to issue outright statutes. She also 
assigns a great deal of authority to the governor who has the power to appoint the state board of 
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education. She describes the legislature as “reactive” and having little direct involvement in 
education.  
Like Fuhrman, Febey and Louis (2008) discuss the role of political culture in state 
educational policy. The authors explore the political cultures of three states (North Carolina, 
Minnesota, and Iowa). They document the “distinctive policy cultures at the state level [that] 
may help to explain the unfolding of states’ educational accountability and standards policies.” 
They also offer a brief history of this type of work, noting that reviews of state policies are 
largely descriptive and generally describe the effectiveness of policy rather than its genesis. 
Their case study approach, like Fuhrman, Bailey et al. (1962), Usdan (1963), Masters et al. 
(1964), and others, offers a broader and more comprehensive look at the development of state 
educational policies, albeit without drawing a strong relationship between other studies.   
 As part of the literature on the state governance structures, much work has been done on 
the rise to prominence of the state and its agencies in educational policymaking. Prior to the 
ESEA in 1965, state education agencies were what one author called “sleepy.” Generally 
speaking, they were poorly staffed and served to mostly collect data and dispense what little 
funds were distributed to local districts. In Conflict, Competition or Cooperation, Abrams (1993) 
describes the decrease of local control and the rise of state level authority as being closely 
associated with the funding for public education. Early in the history of the modern school board 
(early 20th century), when local control was at its zenith, so too was the proportion of local funds 
being used in local schools. As state and federal money has increased, the authority of local 
policymakers has diminished as this funding is often closely tied to new regulation. He describes 
the federal government as a “kingmaker” by routing federal dollars for education through the 
states, thus ensuring the transfer of authority from local to state control. McBeath, Reyes, and 
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Ehlander in Education Reform in the American States (2008) concur with this assessment saying, 
“The increased centralization of public school education at the state level has been matched by 
an increase in state funding of schooling…. Most states [now] allocate at least one third of their 
general fund budgets to K-12 school expenses…” 
Fuhrman and Elmore (1990) also agree that state involvement in education has increased. 
They note that despite a changing shift in policy focus, from school consolidation to finances to 
testing and accountability, state leadership has steadily escalated. More importantly, they go on 
to say that each new reform has added to, instead of replacing, previous laws and regulations. 
They report that, curiously, new efforts at reform “are expressed as mandates or rules, as 
opposed to efforts to build local capacity, and thus they reinforce the image of an increasingly 
obtrusive state presence”. They conclude with the notion that most states lack the capacity to 
assure compliance with the reforms, which leads to the variability seen in their implementation. 
Cooper and Fusarelli (2009) also note the ever increasing role of the state in educational 
policy making in The Rising State. However, while most authors place the beginning of this 
increased role in either the 1970s with a strong focus on equity issues enforced by the states or 
with the Goals 2000 legislation of 1994 and its later No Child Left Behind descendent, these 
authors look to the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) for its roots. The 
basis of their claim, much like Abrams, is that ESEA brought with it federal money to be 
administered by the states as well as the oversight authority on how it would be spent. They refer 
to this period as “the ramping up” phase that would lead to greater authority and the further 
erosion of local control brought on by later reforms.     
Like Abrams (1993), Fusarelli and Cooper (2009), and McBeath et al. (2008), Kirst 
argues in Who Should Control our Schools? (1988) that the trend in American education has 
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been toward decreasing the influence of local school boards and local administration to the 
benefit of the federal and state government and teachers unions. However, he goes farther by 
arguing that this trend has been ongoing since the 1950s as new interest groups began to focus 
the public’s attention on civil issues that had been overlooked, or ignored, by local politics. This 
is at least 15 years longer than the commonly accepted notion, as reported by Fusarelli and 
Cooper, that state-level centralization began sometime after 1965 and implying that state 
centralization has been occurring for 60 years not 35. Unlike, McBeath et al. and Abrams, Kirst 
argues that the motivation for this trend was not money, but essentially a loss of faith on the part 
of the state saying that, “Basically, state governments do not believe that local authorities pay 
sufficient attention to curriculum quality, teacher evaluation, and academic standards” (p. 66).   
Hill (2004) discusses the idea that the whole premise of current educational governance is 
flawed because it stems from a debate over the powers that are inherent or reserved to the state. 
This leads to a constant battle between the levels of federal, state, and local authority for control 
and power. Further, the author claims that all research in the field of the politics of education is 
framed from the notion of a debate between state and federal authority. He proposes the alternate 
consideration of system where the principle of “subsidiary” is dominant. Under this type of 
system, local authority is preserved because decisions are expected to be made as close to the 
citizens as possible. Higher levels of authority only intercede when there is a clear advantage for 
the decision to be made at a higher level of authority. He cites the fundamental nature of the 
principle in the establishment and administration of the European Union. In this system, only 
those decisions that fall into the European Unions area of “exclusive competence” are made at a 
community-wide level. 
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Henig (2009) argues that the image of local obsolescence is “a set of loosely connected 
ideas that has helped to convince political leaders and school reformers that bypassing local 
school districts is not only advisable but the logical and inevitable consequence of broad 
historical trends.” He goes on to argue that two divergent political strands were brought together 
to by-pass localities when No Child Left Behind was passed in 2001. The first of these strands 
was from the Democrats. They sought relief from their frustration at decades of attempting to 
bring about racial and economic equity in education. Henig reports, as they saw the issue, it was 
local forces who were confounding their efforts as “states rights and local democracy have been 
powerful rallying cries” in stopping federal initiatives throughout history. The second strand was 
from the Republicans. They were frustrated with what they perceived as patronage-laden, liberal 
strongholds who were more interested in providing government jobs than being an “engine for 
serious investment in human capital and for closing achievement gaps.” When combined, these 
two stands form a powerful, albeit divergent, coalition who had identified localism and local 
government as their enemy and have sought to incrementally strip its authority. Henig goes on to 
argue that rather than disappear, local school government has simply evolved. While it has lost 
some of its “fabled autonomy”, it has also absorbed new powers and responsibilities. One 
example, among several he notes, is the role the local system plays in the choreographing of 
parental choice in education. 
Jennings (2003) supports Henig by arguing that while NCLB does represent the 
culmination of a policy agenda that began in the mid-1980s, a broader role for the federal 
government in education is not necessarily a bad thing for states and local districts. He argues 
that the increased role of the federal government means that all three levels of the educational 
governance structure must assume responsibilities that they have traditionally ignored or been 
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reticent to assume. The federal level of the governance structure has higher expectations of the 
other levels in the system and has clearly defined those expectations, leaving the details to be 
defined by the states and implemented by the local districts. The role of the local districts has 
therefore not diminished. In fact, they have taken on, or been required to take on, more 
responsibilities than ever. This signals that the role of local administration in the governance 
structure is growing, not receding, as many would argue. Whether this constitutes true “local 
control” is debatable, but it does indicate a strong role is available for the local jurisdictions.   
The state politics of education literature is a young and undeveloped area of the overall 
politics of education literature. With that said, there is progress toward defining cohesive areas of 
interest in the overall body of work. As described in this section, local control, local school 
boards and administrators, and the state governance structure surrounding education seem to 
have emerged as the general areas of interest to those writing for this literature. As the focus of 
the research presented in this paper finds itself interested in each of these subfields, it stands to 
reason that a deeper exploration of them is warranted. Further, the research included in this 
section also begins to address a basic question underlying this research, namely whether local 
control is disappearing. That there is some consensus in all three subfields of the state politics of 
education literature that local control and its governance structure, the school board, has been 
replaced by the emergence of state level governance structures indicates that this has occurred. 
Interestingly, this research also indicates that this may not mean an end to local control but 
simply a redefining of its qualities. With the foundation presented here, the research presented 
later in the paper can address this idea more directly.  
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4.1.4 Power and Authority in Education 
Politics can be defined as “social relations involving intrigue to gain authority or power” 
(Princeton University, 2010). Therefore, any discussion of politics brings with it a concurrent 
discussion of power and authority. As noted previously, several authors have devoted work to 
exploring the relationships that exist between the various actors in the field of education. 
However, few have explored the various aspects of power and authority itself with regard to 
education. Flinchbaugh (1993) offers an excellent overview of power and its uses in education 
with particular regard for superintendents and school board members in The 21st Century Board 
of Education. He offers complete descriptions on the kind of power available (coercive, expert, 
charismatic, situational, etc…) to school administrators. He then goes on to offer advice and 
descriptions on the effective use of power and its application in different situations.         
Zeigler and Jennings with Peak (1974) also explore the uses of power by the board and 
superintendent. Zeigler and Jennings argue that boards are in possession of many authority 
resources but fail to use them, either because they don’t understand their power or they see their 
role as more of community relations. They take command of issues that are deemed “public”, 
such as school construction, and thus seen as the proper role of the board. They tend to pass the 
“internal” day-to-day administrative issues to the superintendents, as they are perceived to 
properly fall into their domain. In essence, they, the lay board, remain overly passive in the 
administration of the district, even on issues which are clearly in their jurisdiction, when 
confronted by expertise of the superintendent. In their conclusions, they argue that “school 
boards should govern or be abolished.”  
Two studies by David Minar (1966a and 1966b) suggest that boards may be stripped of 
their power and authority, not only by the perceived authority of the superintendent, but also by 
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the actions of the community. In these studies, the author found that high levels of public conflict 
in educational policymaking reduces the autonomy and discretion of administrators. This is a 
result of the increased citizen awareness and involvement which comes with a public conflict. 
Minar also notes that “the authority system [in public education] usually is not accustomed to 
being opposed and therefore lacks resilience. Conflict is likely to be a disorganizing shock. 
Whereas, in most democratic government, structured conflict is recognized as the way the game 
is played, in school government it often seems to be regarded as a rude and foreign intrusion.” A 
1976 study by Boyd (Boyd, 1976a) supports Minar’s original findings. 
Power and authority are key themes in the research presented here. A practical 
examination of how others in education have examined these topics is necessary not only to 
provide a definition for this research but also to integrate any potential differences in conception 
that others may present in the respective work. Further, the effective uses of both power and 
authority underlies any political relationship. This project is, at its essence, a study of political 
relationships. In order to undertake this research, a consideration of how others view the concept 
and use of power and authority is necessary. Without this basis, the research undertaken in this 
project would not be able to draw defensible conclusions. 
4.2 EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM LITERATURE 
 
As previously discussed, the body of the politics of education literature can be divided into areas 
of focus, such as state politics of education or educational policy reform. The educational policy 
reform literature comprises a major portion of the work in the politics of education literature. It 
covers analysis of various policy actions in education, local implementation of policy, evaluation 
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of policy effectiveness, critique of policy, and explorations of new concern for educational 
policy among many other things. While not necessarily directly addressing school boards or their 
members, the research on educational reform issues has a profound effect on the board and its 
functions in the oversight of schools. This literature forms the basis for the analysis of current 
educational policy, as well as the basis for future changes to the system, all of which will bear 
down on the local school board.  
McBeath et al. (2008) do a particularly good job of laying out the historical evolution of 
policy reforms in the United States. The authors note the episodic nature of educational reforms 
and the difficulty of evaluating them as there is little time between each. They propose to explore 
the effectiveness of reform based on three categories: (a) inputs, which considers changes to the 
facilities and faculty; (b) incentives, which considers options for increasing competition; and (c) 
output, which considers assessment and accountability systems. They also make an in-depth 
exploration of the progression of federal reforms, starting with the ESEA through NCLB 
legislation, and the effect that they have had on the states.  
In Tinkering Toward Utopia (1995), Tyack and Cuban also offer an excellent summary 
on the history of and motivations for the various school reforms that have occurred in American 
education. They take special care to note the political trends and the influence they have  had on 
the reform movements. Both authors have written extensively on the subject of school reform 
and historical context in other forums, but here they have pulled their combined work together to 
offer a compact and useful document on both subjects. Of particular interest to this research is 
the second chapter, which explains the cyclical nature of policy in education in similar but 
different terms than McBeath et al. Tyack and Cuban describe the reported notion among 
policymakers and practitioners in education that “it’s like déjà vu all over again” which alludes 
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to the larger concept of the cyclical nature of policy reforms. However, the authors note an 
important distinction that often goes unreported in other policy research in that there is a 
difference between policy talk and policy action. Policy talk, or the diagnosing of problems and 
advocating solutions, is distinct from policy action, or the adoption of reforms by authorities, but 
both are necessary for innovation to occur. Of the two, policy talk is cyclical owing to the 
political nature and difficulty in achieving policy action. The authors say that policy talk, as 
opposed to policy action, is not “futile and irrational [as some may think] but rather the 
inevitable result of conflicts of values and interest built into a democratic system of school 
governance and reflecting changing climates of public opinion.”    
In writing the 1982 edition of The Politics of Education: Schools in Conflict, Wirt and 
Kirst could not have known of the transitions about to take place in education. They argue that 
local control has been a myth since the 1970s, owing to the multitude of stakeholders who 
entered the governance space in that decade. The book is pre-A Nation at Risk and makes no note 
regarding the type of changes coming to education. It does, however, accurately predict the 
increasing role of non-local control over education and the movement of authority to state and 
federal agencies. However, it limits its scope to finance reform as that was the extent of most 
state involvement during the late 1970s. It would not be until after A Nation at Risk was 
published in 1983 that states would begin to take a serious look at deep involvement in local 
issues with regard to curriculum. It also notes that while forces whose ultimate aim is to finally 
end local control have many advocates at all levels, those who support a strong role for the local 
community in education have few. This book has been included in this review for several 
reasons, but primarily because it is often quoted in the literature. Also this edition provides good 
background on the political and social upheaval of the 1970s that lead to the standards-based 
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reform movement of the mid-1980s and 1990s. The book was written and published at a time of 
great flux in both the politics of education literature, between the 3rd and 4th eras of the literature, 
and in the field of education as a whole. As such, it provides an excellent basis for understanding 
the changing dynamics in education during the time period in which it was published.   
As McBeath et al. and Cuban and Tyack both discuss and Wirt and Kirst (1982) evince, 
educational policy reform is cyclical and highly tied to the political trends of the day. With that 
being said, it is hard to ignore the role that political ideology plays in American education and 
the influence that personal political preference can have on a system that is designed and 
intended to be divorced of the fractious nature of politics. As already discussed, Henig notes the 
jointure of Democratic and Republican beliefs in developing the No Child Left Behind 
legislation.  Kimbrough (1989) further explores the influence of political ideology on education 
in “Do Political Ideologies Influence Education in the United States?”. It briefly explores the role 
that left of center and right of center political ideologies play in the creation of educational 
policies in the United States. It also notes the troubling influence of extreme conservatives in the 
educational system citing their “intimidating influence” as a potential future hurdle toward more 
progressive reforms in the public schools as well as in higher education. One could view this 
statement as an early omen of the effect of the standards-based reform and school choice 
movements on public education as both were initially engineered and championed by political 
conservatives.  
Of the education policy reform literature that does speak directly to school boards, Who’s 
in Charge Here? by Epstein (2004) has collected several insightful and useful chapters on the 
issue of authority and control in modern educational governance. In “Introduction: Who Should 
Be in Charge of Our Schools?”, Epstein discusses the confusing web of politicians and 
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policymakers that oversee education. He also discusses the growing movement to replace the 
separate school governance system that exists in most states with a system of direct control under 
Governors or local mayors. He suggests the reason for this change is to provide greater visibility 
and increase accountability for the results, intended or not, of policy reforms. He concludes by 
positing and discussing several alternative questions regarding educational governance and 
control as a way to introduce larger discussions in the book’s chapters.  
 Cuban’s “A Solution that Lost It’s Problem” (2004) discusses the reasons and results of 
the trend of centralization in American schools. The article contains an excellent breakdown of 
the motivations leading to school centralization. It also lists several compounding reasons for 
why standards-based reforms have not or, as Cuban sees it, cannot work with any uniformity. 
Cuban argues that several polls have found that there is broad support for local school boards and 
their decision-making capacity. He contends that people want local authority over the schools, 
and given the spotty record of state and federal mandates, there is no reason to strip local boards 
of this power. Instead, we should embrace it and work more closely with local boards to create 
reforms that make sense in the local context.  
Fuhrman’s “Standards, Testing, and the Fear of Federal Control” (2004) uses Principal 
Agent Theory in its discussion of federal control over schools. She argues that in the context of 
the principal agent relationship, it is difficult to see how the principal, federal policymakers, can 
provide significant inducements or sanctions to get the agents, state and local school officials, to 
do the work required to not only fully implement the standards but also achieve the goals. She 
goes on to state that federal involvement in school reforms historically has produced limited 
results. Fuhrman also suggests that NCLB requires an altered role for state and local district 
relations. It assumes that states have far greater control over local districts than they have in 
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reality. She argues that in most jurisdictions states have only recently, since the 1970s, taken an 
interest in educational policy and then limiting it to finances. As the states have desired more 
authority over other areas traditionally reserved for local districts, such as curriculum and 
instruction, they have failed to adequately address the loose relationship between them that 
characterizes local control. Without this coupling, efficient and universal dispersal of NCLB or 
any reform is difficult in each state, let alone the nation as a whole.  
Fuhrman also notes the strong connection between politically savvy superintendents and 
state legislators who must be sensitive to the needs of their local constituents, particularly on hot 
button issues like education. Fuhrman notes the strong relationship that should exist between the 
superintendent and the local state legislators. She argues that good superintendents know that if 
they, or better yet the citizens of the local district, have an issue with state or federal education 
policy that they have an ally in their local legislator. By removing the will of the school board in 
the policymaking process, you tighten the relationship between the state appointed (or elected) 
superintendent and the elected local official. 
Writings surrounding educational policy reform make up a considerable part of the 
politics of education literature, if not education literature in general. While this writing often 
ignores or gives short shrift to the school board for reasons explored elsewhere in this review, the 
effect of the polices that grow from this literature has a profound effect on the school board. It is 
in this literature that the historical evolution, or more accurately the cyclical nature, of 
educational policy can be traced. As described here, each wave of policy reform has brought 
with it an increased role for authorities beyond the local school district to hold sway over local 
decision making. Thus, like the state politics of education literature, this body of literature is key 
in determining whether local control has been lost by local school boards. 
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4.3 PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION 
Despite the wide acceptance of PAT in certain segments of political science research, 
particularly the field of political economy, as a whole, it has not commonly been used to study 
the relationships that exist in educational bureaucracies at the basic education level. There are 
exceptions of course, one of which is the work of Terry Moe who has long been a supporter of 
using PAT in politics of education research. As the next section will describe, Moe has made a 
significant contribution to the field by refocusing the analysis onto the role of the bureaucracy 
itself. Another exception is in the field of higher education research where several authors 
(Hearn & Griswold, 1997; Lane, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Liefner, 2003; Lowry, 2001; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Toma, 1986, 1990) have attempted to use PAT to study the 
relationships that govern state oversight of public institutions. Toma’s 1986 analysis focused on 
the selection of a type of governing board for public universities. She found that where taxpayers 
have the highest ability to influence legislative decisions, there was a decrease in the 
centralization of public boards. She followed up her study in 1990 by examining how the type of 
board chosen impacts the operation of public universities. She found that the structure of the 
board is important because it defines the constrains put on the members of the board. If the board 
is less centralized (meaning separate from the public bureaucracy), it will function more like a 
private university. Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) used PAT to “examine the structures of 
higher education boards to gain a better understanding of how they interact with politics to affect 
higher education policy”. In essence, the researchers wanted to know whether varying levels of 
centralization in governance structure in the university facilitate or impede politicians and 
thereby insulate higher education policies from politics. The researchers theorized that to the 
extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic autonomy, it should 
55 
limit the ability of elected officials to influence education policies. The study produced mixed 
results, but they were able to conclude that governance structure does have a significant role in 
the insulation of educational policy from elected officials.  
Jason Lane is among the handful of researchers currently applying PAT in the 
educational arena. Although his research (Lane, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008) is concerned with 
the oversight relationships that exist between the state and public universities, his work has 
nonetheless served as the blueprint for the discussion of state oversight of school boards that 
underlies the research question here. Lane (2007) uses PAT to explore the information 
asymmetries that exist between the state and a public institution, in this case two public 
universities, that it oversees. The goal of the study was to identify the types of oversight 
mechanisms that inform the state about the activities of the public institutions (the universities). 
In essence, it is exploring the question of how the state finds out about what its constituent parts 
are up to given that the constituent has an advantage over the information shared. Lane found 
that oversight of the public institution resembled a “spider web” of formal and informal oversight 
mechanisms, with each strand a single component of that system. As separate events in a very 
large system, each strand is unnoticeable, and therefore unable to effectively highlight violations 
in the system, limiting its oversight capacity. However, when woven together, each strand forms 
part of  a system where very few of a public institution’s activities go unmonitored. Lane and 
Kivisto built upon this previous work in 2008 by offering a chapter in Higher Education: 
Handbook on Theory and Practice. In the chapter, they outline the development of PAT and its 
applications in examining relationships that are primarily external to public institutions. 
Although this project seeks to understand the relationship between school boards and the 
external oversight of the state as represented by the state board of education, the application of 
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Lane’s work in this research project is useful as it is highly correlated and provides a template 
upon which to base the study.  
The principal agent theory has gained acceptance as a primary basis for analysis of 
political relationships in both political science and certain segments of educational research. 
Despite this, PAT has not been systematically applied in a large scale research project pertaining 
to basic education. Fuhrman (2004) did make use of PAT in discussing federal control over 
schools, however, it was applied to modes of control and therefore not systematically used in a 
general analysis. Where it has been systematically applied to higher education research, it has 
been used to study the relationships that exist in the bureaucracy. As this project is primarily an 
examination of the political relationships that oversee basic education in Pennsylvania, its use 
here is justified by the literature.  
4.4 EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY 
 
Principal agent theory finds its roots in the development of the new institutionalism perspective 
found in the organizational theory and sociology literature of the late 1970s and mid-1980s 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Mitnick, 
1980; Moe, 1984). New institutionalism itself was a reaction to shortcomings in the neo-classical 
and behavioral science approaches to studying organizations and their behavior. Neo-classic 
researchers and behavioralists tended to focus their inquiry on the individual entrepreneur who 
was perceived as all-powerful and all-knowing in running the organization and the organization 
itself as a series of individual decisions. New institutionalism recognized that an organization 
consists of individuals whose collective decisions have a tremendous influence on the 
57 
organization as a whole (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). New institutionalism developed as a way to 
incorporate theories about the power of institutional structures with theories about the power of 
individuals. Principal agent theory (PAT) emerged from the new institutionalism literature as a 
way to account for both the self interest of the actor as well as the role that organizational 
structure play in constraining that behavior (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  
The application of PAT in political science studies began to occur in the mid-1980s after 
its initial acceptance in the sociology and economics literature. A broad look at the literature 
indicates the traditional use of PAT in political science is in the study of bureaucratic 
relationships where oversight and individual autonomy are intertwined with hierarchical 
structures. Mitnick (1980), a political economist, was the first to use PAT in the study of public 
bureaucracies. Weingast and Moran (1983), Weingast (1984), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), 
and McCubbins (1985) all make use of PAT in the study of Congressional oversight by finding 
that just because Congress is not directly monitoring the actions of the bureaucracies that it 
funds, it is not necessarily shirking its regulatory duties as described by the Constitution. They 
found that, in fact, Congress provides a combination of previously unrecognized direct and 
indirect oversight mechanisms in order to perform its regulatory functions.  
While previous studies had successfully applied the dictums of PAT to problems in the 
field of political science, its use was still an overlay of an economic theory onto political science 
issues. March and Olsen (1984) followed closely by Moe (1984) along with McCubbins and 
Schwartz (1984) offer the most cohesive defining of a new strain of PAT in which the 
bureaucratic relationship was under review. These studies looked at how the organization itself 
was responsible for the behavior that occurred in political structures. Moe’s 1984 work “The 
New Economics of Organization” has become the foundational work on the application of PAT 
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to political science and opened a wholly new field of inquiry in political science. In it, Moe 
argues that everything the government does is based on a contract with the voters, bureaucrats, 
private corporations, and the like and thus the fundamental problem of agency (self-interest) 
exists at all levels of government. This theory would later go on to ground Moe’s other seminal 
work, 1990’s  Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (with John Chubb), where they argue 
that the entire educational system needs to be reconstituted in order to eliminate the problem of 
agency. Moe has gone on to further refine and use the elements of PAT in conjunction with his 
work on educational bureaucracy (see Moe in Petersen & West, 2003; Moe, 2005). In 2005, 
Miller noted that PAT’s level of flexibility in studying an array of political relationships is one of 
its enduring qualities and the reason for its popularity and usage in the field. 
4.5 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of academic work that explores the function and role of the public school board is 
quite a small part of the overall education literature. As explored in section 4.1.1, it would seem 
that as the literature regarding the governance of schools has developed over the years, school 
boards have become a forgotten or ignored piece of the structure of education. One of the goals 
of this research is to help to change that trend by investigating the environment in which they 
function. Efforts have been made in the politics of education literature and the educational policy 
reform literature, as well as the state and local government literature in political science, to 
explore the role of school boards and the political context in which they operate. However, as 
discussed in section 4.1.2, much of this literature is relatively new and has been evolving slowly.  
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Dividing the overall literature pertaining to school boards into eras allows this research to 
better isolate and highlight key points in the evolution of research on school board governance 
while also providing a system of organization that the literature has lacked. This literature can 
also be divided into two areas of interest: the state politics of education and the educational 
policy reform literature. The state politics of education literature can be further parsed into three 
subfields covering local control, local school boards and administrators, and the state governance 
structure. It is in these subfields where this research begins to address a basic question 
underlying this research, namely whether local control is disappearing. That there is some 
consensus in all three subfields of the state politics of education literature that local control and 
its governance structure, the school board, has been replaced by the emergence of state level 
governance structures indicates that this has occurred. Interestingly, as discussed by Henig 
(2009), this research also indicates that this may not mean an end to local control but simply a 
redefining of its qualities.  
The educational policy reform literature comprises the bulk of work in the politics of 
education. While not necessarily taking a direct look at school boards or their members, this 
research has a tremendous effect on the board and its functions in the oversight of schools. It is 
in this literature that the historical evolution, or more accurately the cyclical nature described by 
Tyack and Cuban (1995), of educational policy can be traced. As described here, each wave of 
policy reform has brought with it an increased role for authorities beyond the local school district 
to hold sway over local decision making. Thus, like the state politics of education literature, this 
body of literature is key in determining whether local control has been lost by local school 
boards. 
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  There are reasons why the school board has been generally overlooked in the literature. 
The waning influence of local control that is perceived to have started in the 1970s has left few 
of the traditional policy functions of the board intact (Jung & Kirst, 1989; Tyack in Hightower et 
al., 2002; Kirst in Epstein, 2004; McBeath et al. 2008; Fusarelli & Cooper, 2009). As power and 
authority have shifted to state agencies and then to federal agencies, this has left little for 
academics to study with regard to local school boards. Boards have also become less visible in 
the new policy environment as they have become caught up in the cyclical nature of policy 
reform debates, as reported by Mcbeath et al. (2008) and Tyack and Cuban (1995), which are 
generally carried out in a state or national context. Finally, as described by Zeigler and Jennings 
with Peak (1974), Boyd (1976), and Flinchbaugh (1993), boards have historically failed to 
evaluate and assert their power and authority in an effective manner. This continues to happen 
today, especially as the ground has shifted during the restructuring of education policy that has 
taken place over the last 15 years.  
As this project is a study of political relationships, power and authority are key to the 
examination as the effective use of both power and authority underlie any political relationship. 
Therefore, the research presented in this study finds its roots in the state politics of education 
literature and the literature of state and local governance in political science. As discussed in 
sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, it is also consequently beholden to the research techniques of multiple 
disciplines. The principal agent theory is one of those techniques and it has gained acceptance as 
a primary basis for analysis of political relationships in both political science and certain 
segments of educational research. Despite this, PAT has never been applied in a large scale 
research project pertaining to basic education. As discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, it has been 
effectively applied to higher education research to study the relationships that exist in the 
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bureaucracy. As this project is primarily an examination of the political relationships that oversee 
basic education in Pennsylvania, the use of the principal agent theory as the primary mode of 
investigation is warranted.   
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5.0  RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY: CASE STUDY 
A case study methodology was selected for this research. According to Yin (2003), this 
methodology is appropriate for research asking “how” questions where the focus is on 
contemporary events and the researcher has no control over the behavior of the events in the 
study.  As Yin states, “The case study is used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge 
of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomenon… the case study 
has been a common research strategy [in the social sciences]” (Yin, 2003). It is particularly 
useful in investigating events that are occurring in a real life context. As such, the use of a case 
study methodology in this project has provided a concrete record of the on-going interactions and 
events that have become the basis for developing generalized conceptions and theories regarding 
the effect of NCLB on the relationship under review. As it is a commonly accepted and 
appropriate methodology for empirical inquiry into phenomenon within its real-life context, it 
was the preferred paradigm.  
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) suggest that case studies allow for richer contextual 
details and more precise data to emerge. Larger studies produce tremendous volumes of data in 
which subtle details may be lost or obscured. Further, larger studies often force researchers to 
rely on so called “second best measures” for data collection. These measures, while instructive to 
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a broad audience, usually fail to elicit the details that are most important to researchers. The use 
of case studies allows for more labor intensive data collection techniques, such as the interviews 
that will be utilized here, which would be virtually impossible to manage in a large multi-case 
study. These techniques allow for a potentially more detailed picture to emerge.  
5.1.1 The Critical Case 
Yin also states that a case study is appropriate when it represents the critical case in testing a 
theory. He describes the critical case as one where the case fully meets all of the conditions that 
have been defined by the theory. In this project, there are three such conditions. The first 
condition is a state with a long history of strong localized school districts controlled by school 
boards. For example, most states in the southeast and many parts of the mid- and far west utilize 
a broad county based system. The second is a state school board of education which shares 
authority with the state department of education. For example, Texas and California, in 
particular, have reputations for having dominating and highly influential state boards of 
education while Wisconsin has no state board of education. The last condition is a state that is 
currently compliant and fully participating in the provisions of the “No Child Left Behind” 
legislation. Virginia, Minnesota, Connecticut, Utah, and Arizona have all either protested their 
forced participation under the law or taken state-level action to fully opt-out of the law and its 
funding provisions.  
Pennsylvania, or its precedent lands, has had a tradition of localized control over 
educational matters since before the modern state’s inception in 1681. Prior to consolidation 
efforts in the mid-1960s, the state had over 2000 school districts with some districts being simply 
a single school. At one point it had nearly 2600 local operating districts. It has a long tradition as 
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one of the very models of local control. As previously stated, the state board of education is the 
primary authority over the schools in Pennsylvania. However, it solicits and receives 
considerable input in the form of guidance from the state department of education. The state 
board is situated in the state bureaucracy under the department of education for administrative 
purposes and contains the secretary of education as an ex officio member. However, it is 
considered a separate and autonomous organization under the law. Pennsylvania law therefore 
sets up a cooperative system between the state board and the department of education. In this 
way, no one agency is given absolute control over decisions affecting the schools. Pennsylvania 
has participated in the NCLB legislation since its inception in 2002. The state was one of the first 
to present its accountability system to the federal department of education in May of 2002 and 
was the first state, in 2005, to release the accountability report cards required under NCLB. 
While somewhat unpopular in certain professional corridors, NCLB has never been significantly 
challenged in Pennsylvania. As of February 2007, Pennsylvania Secretary of Education 
Zahorchak defended the spirit and intent of the legislation while asking for certain changes to be 
made that would privilege states like Pennsylvania that are in full compliance with the law (PDE, 
2007).  
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) suggest that for many research questions a case study 
is appropriate when looking at sub-state administrative units and when conditions in that state 
reflect a theoretically interesting variation. This approach is therefore justified here as the nature 
of this study, to examine the relationship between a state educational administration and strong 
local school boards under the NCLB environment, requires looking at sub-state administrative 
units in a state that has a long and model history of local control. While Pennsylvania is by no 
means the only state with administrative school districts, it is one of a few states to have highly 
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localized administrative units and has had such a tradition since the 1600s. It is therefore unique 
among its peers.  
5.2 PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
Since according to Merriam (1998) sample selection occurs first at the case level and then again 
once the case is chosen, the sample here (Pennsylvania School Board Presidents and State Board 
Members) was predetermined by the initial case selection criteria as described in Section 4.1. It 
was beyond the capacity of this project to interview all 22 members of the Pennsylvania State 
Board of Education. Further, not every member of the state board participates in the oversight of 
basic education, as the state board is also responsible for proprietary schools and higher 
education in the state. It was also beyond the capacity of this project to interview all 4500 school 
board members from across Pennsylvania. As such, another criterion-based selection was used to 
identify school board and state board members to be interviewed. Three criteria were used for 
selection of the sample to receive interview requests.  
1) Only members who have served on the state board or a local school board for a 
minimum of three years were chosen for an interview request. This information was 
available from the State Board of Education website and the Pennsylvania School 
Boards Association. This criterion is to ensure that those interviewed have had some 
time to become familiar with the dealings of the board and the issues that they face.  
2) Only school board members from the school districts in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania (See Figure 1) were considered for interview requests. This helped to 
reduce the number of potential interviews with local school board members from 
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3) Only currently serving local school board presidents were considered for an interview 
request. This criterion had the dual effect of further reducing the number of potential 
interviews from 390 to 42 and also ensuring that the people who have the most 
responsibility for the school board were given the broadest opportunity to speak for 
the board.  
The final result for this process of selection resulted in a maximum pool of 42 school board 
presidents and 11 state board members (as of June 2009) who could have potentially received an 
interview request. 
 
 Figure 1. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania School Districts  
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Qualitative research techniques favor context rich cases regardless of number instead of 
large numbers of context stripped cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The goal is not to have as 
many as possible as in a quantitative sample, but to have instructive and pointed examples that 
highlight and offer depth to the research. Further, Beamer (2002) states that for populations that 
include highly placed policymakers, a stratified sampling approach is appropriate to ensure that 
many key policymakers are included in the interviews. To this end, the school districts of 
Allegheny County were divided into three categories.  
The school districts of Allegheny County were stratified into three categories based on 
the median household income in the district (Lincoln Interactive, 2009) (see Table 3). The 
median household income of the district was chosen because it is a commonly accepted way of 
ranking and stratifying school districts in Pennsylvania based on a fixed criterion. Further, the 
statistic is an indicator of the socio-economic development in the district which may have 
bearing on the interview responses. The group labels of “Under $35k”, “Between $35,001 and 
$50k”, and “Over $50k” were created to represent the division of the districts.  
Table 3. Allegheny County School District Strata Based on Median Household Income 
Under $35k (14) $35,001 to $50k (16) Over $50k (13) 
Duquesne City $19,766 
Clairton City $25,596 
Sto-Rox $26,552 
Wilkinsburg Boro $26,621 
McKeesport Area $27,521 
Pittsburgh City $28,575 
East Allegheny $29,010 
Steel Valley $29,607 
Keystone Oaks $30,430 
Northgate $30,542 
Highlands $31,631 
Cornell $32,013 
South Allegheny $32,167 
Woodland Hills $33,352  
West Mifflin Area $35,958 
Carlynton $36,006 
Riverview $36,678 
Brentwood Boro $37,013 
Allegheny Valley $37,913 
Penn Hills $39,960 
Elizabeth Forward $40,996 
Chartiers Valley $41,352 
Gateway $42,232 
Shaler Area $43,239 
Baldwin-Whitehall $42,387 
Deer Lakes $43,913 
North Hills $44,797 
Plum Borough $48,386 
Montour $49,474 
West Jefferson Hills $49,638  
West Allegheny $50,241 
Quaker Valley $50,809 
South Park $51,001 
Avonworth $51,039 
Fox Chapel Area $51,940 
South Fayette $53,739 
Bethel Park $53,479 
Moon Area $56,096 
Hampton $60,307 
Mt. Lebanon $60,783 
Pine-Richland $66,343 
North Allegheny $70,431 
Upper St. Clair $87,581  
*adapted from the Lincoln Interactive Student Assessment Analysis (2007) 
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Three school board presidents were randomly chosen from each of these three strata, 
resulting in nine who were initially contacted with an interview request. Eventually, three of 
these individuals agreed to participate and were interviewed. An additional nine interview 
requests were subsequently distributed to local board presidents and increased the total 
participation of local board presidents to 10. Of these ten participants in the interviews, at least 
three were from each economic strata. Nine members of the state board were also contacted 
based on their participation with subcommittees that focus on basic education in Pennsylvania. 
Four of these individuals agreed to participate and were interviewed.  
Of the 27 people contacted and re-contacted for an interview, 14 eventually agreed to be 
interviewed for the research (four state board members and 10 local board presidents). Of those 
who did not agree to be interviewed, the vast majority offered no explanation, but those who did 
attributed it to a busy schedule or a lack of interest. Of those who did participate, seven were 
male and seven were female. All participants were Caucasian. As a side note, at the time of the 
interviews, 93% of the board presidents in Allegheny County were Caucasian regardless of the 
racial makeup of the local district. All interviewees had at least 3 years of service on their 
respective boards, with 72% having 7 years or more of service.  
The protocol for the research (see Appendix A) promised the participants specific 
protection for their identity in return for participating in the research. Providing explicit details 
regarding the participants would threaten to violate this promise. The small number of actual 
participants and the closeness of the community involved in the research further threatens to 
violate any promised anonymity should additional detailed descriptive data, such as geographic 
region, employment, district demographics, or political affiliations be provided. For these 
reasons this material has been omitted.   
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5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection in this project took the form of a semi-structured interview of school board 
presidents and state board of education members. The interviews were semi-structured, in that 
while being guided by the predetermined research questions, but there was ample opportunity for 
the researcher to ask additional questions and follow-up questions that were not included in the 
script. Data for this project was also gathered through document research and analysis such as 
the state statutes, state board meeting minutes, and local board meeting minutes (Hodder, 1994). 
These techniques were chosen since data on the subject is not observable and not readily 
available through other sources. Participants were selected based on the criteria outlined in the 
section 5.2 of this study. The interview protocol contains six questions. Participants were 
informed that it is designed to be completed in as little as 20-30 minutes, but that they may 
utilize as much time as they wish. The timeframe was chosen with the knowledge that the people 
who are being solicited for an interview are “high status” individuals with busy schedules. The 
idea of including a functional time limit is that if people know in advance what time 
commitments are expected of them, it may make them more willing to participate. In practice, 
the average interview time among the 14 participants was 43 minutes. Participants were asked to 
review a brief consent form that outlines the timeframe, interview topic, and contains a 
confidentiality disclosure (see Appendix A). 
Because all participants were promised anonymity, participants are not identified by 
name in the research analysis. At no time was the identity of the participant linked to the 
recording, transcript, or interview notes that result from the interview. All interview recordings 
and transcripts were given a random code and not dated to make certain there is no way to 
identify the participant of each interview based on the data collection technique. Any data, 
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interviews, transcripts, consent forms, or research notes are kept by the researcher under lock and 
at no time will they be made public.      
In preparation for the interviews, the predefined protocol questions were supplemented 
with additional questions and information pertinent to that specific interview, such as 
professional and biographical details about the subject, subcommittee work, affiliations to help 
the interviewer ask more targeted and detailed questions for richer responses. Further, evidence 
of the interviewer’s awareness of this information was designed to help to relax and build a 
rapport with the subject being interviewed. Additionally, prompts such as expected answers or 
detailed subjects of interest were developed for all questions in order to help respondents round 
out their answers with deeper insights. While the core of the protocol questions remained intact 
to ensure that each person is asked the same questions, they were modified to reflect the 
respondent’s position on either the state board or a local school board. Finally, follow up 
questions took any form as dictated by the initial responses, time, or the subject’s direction. 
Table 4. Research Protocol Interview Questions 
Interview Questions 
1) In what manner does your position require you to directly interact with the state board 
of education and PDE/local school boards? 
2) How would you characterize the state government's view of public education? Local 
school boards? 
3) How would you define the relationship between the state board\PDE and local school 
boards? Has the presence of NCLB had an effect on the relationship? How? 
4) If the state board and PDE are able to control the actions of local school boards how do 
they accomplish this? 
5) Can you think of any times when your board may have altered its actions because of 
a potential conflict with the state/local school boards? 
6) What oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that local school boards are 
responsive to state board and PDE directives? 
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5.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis for this project follows a content analysis approach as described by several 
researchers (Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003); Bazeley (2003); Merriam (1998); Manning and 
Cullum-Swan (1994); LeCompte and Preissle (1992); Wolcott (1992)). Holsti (1969) describes 
this approach as a ”technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
indentifying specified characteristics of messages.” It has also been described as dealing with 
“qualitative data quantitatively.” (Miles & Huberman,1994) The primary use of content analysis 
is when undertaking a comparative analysis using data derived in a qualitative manner, as is the 
case with the interview data in this project. (Bazeley, 2003) 
5.4.1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis involves the systematic classifying of segments of narrative data into categories 
based on themes in the research. Categories can be predetermined based on the conceptual 
framework and theory under investigation (a priori themes analysis). Conversely, the categories 
can be left unidentified until after analysis has started in an effort to see what themes emerge 
(emergent themes analysis). In either case, the goal of content analysis is to identify dominant 
patterns and co-occurrences of themes. Once established, these patterns can be used to draw 
conclusions about the relationship of the data to the hypothesis.  
In this project, the a priori themes analysis was the technique of choice. Categories, such 
as “local control”, “NCLB”, “autonomy”, or “state” were chosen based on the conceptual 
framework. The data was then transcribed and collated into strings of text which were then 
linked to the predefined categories. By prescribing what is expected to be found through the 
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selection of at least the initial categories, the research tool is linked directly to the theory of the 
paper and the conceptual framework. The data is still allowed to guide the research as new 
categories can still emerge from the analysis. Content analysis seeks to find co-ordination of 
themes and patterns, however it is still up to the researcher to give those patterns meaning.  
5.4.2 Coding 
Merriam (1994) describes coding as “nothing more than assigning some sort of shorthand 
designation to various aspects of your data so that you can easily retrieve specific pieces of the 
data.” She goes on to say that coding can be quite simple or take on multiple levels of 
complexity beginning with the initial method for storing the data. This project employed the use 
of a voice recorder during the interview process. These recordings have been transcribed through 
the use of a paid transcriptionist service provided by the University of Pittsburgh’s University 
Center for Social and Urban Research (UCSUR). The original audio recordings have also been 
preserved and stored. The transcribed data was then entered into the qualitative data analysis 
program Atlas ti 6.0 where the predetermined a priori categories were utilized for analysis of 
dominant patterns and co-occurrences. 
5.5 STUDY VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
With regard to validity in a qualitative research design, there is dissent among qualitative 
researchers about how to define the concept and useful terminology. Consensus does seem to 
exist, however, that the term “validity” itself is incomplete or incapable of offering a meaningful 
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definition to qualitative researchers in the field. Most who have considered the issue have offered 
new terminology with more clearly defined meanings in an attempt to overcome this problem. In 
this vein, Creswell (2007) suggests eight “validation strategies” for qualitative researchers that 
“document the ‘accuracy’ of the studies.” These strategies have been outlined in Table 5. He 
suggests that any qualitative design employ at least two of these strategies. 
Table 5. Validation Strategies for Qualitative Research 
Strategy Definition 
Prolonged 
Engagement 
Building trust with participants, learning the culture, and therefore checking for distortions 
and inaccuracies introduced by the researcher  
Triangulation Making use of multiple sources, methods, and theories to provide corroborating evidence  
Peer  
Review/Debriefing 
Process by which an outside individual asks hard questions of the researcher and their 
design and also provides a sounding board for the researcher’s feelings  
Negative Case 
Analysis 
The working hypothesis of the research is refined as inquiry advances in the light of 
disconforming evidence until all cases fit the evidence at hand 
Researcher Bias Clarification from the outset of researcher positions, bias, and assumptions  
Member Checking The researcher solicits the views of participants on the credibility of findings and interpretations 
“Thick” Description Rich, detailed description of the process, context, and participants in the design 
External Audits An examination by an external unconnected consultant to survey the accuracy both the process and the product of the account 
*adapted from Creswell’s (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 2nd Edition 
 This project uses several of these strategies in an effort to build validity for the research 
presented. While the confidentiality clause of the research protocol prevents precise 
identification of the individuals who participated in the interviews, “thick” descriptions are 
offered of their policymaking roles and the process by which they were interviewed. Further, 
their position in the context of the research question is clearly defined which adds to this 
description by highlighting their importance to the study. Member checking has also been 
employed, as each participant has been offered the opportunity to review the final research prior 
to publication in an attempt to increase its credibility. External audits have been conducted by 
unconnected scholars and experts in the field of education administration in an attempt to give 
credence to the process by which the research was carried out. Finally, as is the case with any 
dissertation, peer review is also being employed in this study. The credibility of the data 
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presented has been and will continue to be scrutinized and questioned by a committee of 
scholars.      
 With regard to reliability, Silverman (2005) suggests that it can be enhanced by the 
researcher obtaining and retaining detailed field notes. In this study, a high quality handheld 
digital recorder was employed. Each digital recording was then transferred to a computer where 
it remains archived. Silverman further states that transcriptions made from the recordings need to 
indicate the seemingly trivial pauses and overlaps as they can provide a more detailed 
interpretation of the answer. These pauses and overlaps were preserved in the transcription 
process and, thus, were available during the coding of the data. As the data was transcribed by a 
single individual and coded only by the researcher, intercoder reliability is not relevant here.   
5.6 LIMITATIONS 
Creswell (2007) notes that one of the biggest challenges in developing any case study research, 
whether it is a single or multiple case design, is the collection of data regarding a case. It is 
imperative that the researcher have enough information to display a detailed picture of the case. 
If not, then the case opens the overall research to questions of value and perhaps even 
generalizability. According to Yin (2003), this is particularly true in the case of a single case 
research design.  
A limitation with the research presented here is that it was not able to include a larger and 
more geographically diverse portion of state and local policymakers in the data collection 
process. Due to the factors of convenience, time, and funding, the research was limited to one 
county, albeit a large and populous one, among 67 highly divergent counties in Pennsylvania. In 
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the context of the research data presented here, reasonable and appropriate efforts have been 
made to account and adjust for the disparities that may exist among the researched population. 
However, it was unable to consider important internal factors that exist in Pennsylvania at-large 
that may have had an effect on the findings overall. These factors include, but are not limited to, 
issues such as the marked economic disparity between western and eastern PA school districts, 
regional and sub-regional variations in political beliefs, and sub-regional ethnic and cultural 
variations.  
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6.0  POLITICAL INTERACTION IN PA EDUCATION 
6.1 CREATING THEMES BASED ON CODES 
The codes used in this research were all created from the a priori analysis developed by the 
researcher based on the research framework and the history of local control in Pennsylvania. 
They create categories under which the comments of responders can be sorted. The categories 
also, in some cases, expand the initial predetermined meaning of the code based on how it is 
used by those interviewed in their responses. The sub-headings for this chapter, which represent 
the cohesive themes, were then built by the researcher from both the a priori codes and 
comments of the respondents after being sorted into a code category with one exception. The 
theme of Delegation and Deference was not created based on the a priori codes. It was built from 
the comments of the interviewees after a pattern of action became evident afterg the sorting of 
comments into categories.  
The themes are a way to organize and clarify the overall meaning of the respondents’ 
comments by grouping the categories and their comments of similar interest or focus into one 
milieu. In this way, the comments are better able to detail the “real world” operation of the 
relationship between the state board of education and the local school boards. As such, the 
themes are not meant as a specific way to compare and contrast the responses of those 
interviewed. Quotations from the interviews have been provided to highlight the intended 
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meaning or to represent how the concept of the term is displayed in the responses provided 
during all of the interviews. 
The legal definitions and expectations of the relationship have been described in previous 
chapters. This chapter defines the relationship based on the observations of those who engage in 
it. After analyzing the data gathered from school board presidents and state board of education 
members, four cohesive themes were developed from the data. Each theme discusses aspects of 
the system in which the district school boards interact with the state board and other 
policymakers in the state.  
Three of the themes presented here are based on the codes which were developed, as 
previously discussed, prior to performing the interviews. The codes provide categories and the 
comments made by those interviewed are sorted into each category. The theme of Delegation and 
Deference was developed after the sorting of comments into categories. After sorting, it falls to 
the researcher to discern meaning from the sorted data. Most of the themes have therefore been 
developed by using predetermined key words, grouping the responses of participants, and then 
combining the most revealing and interrelated key words to form the themes. In all cases, the 
definitions provided for each theme reflect both a commonly held meaning as well as meaning 
derived from the statements of research participants as a group. As each respondent may or may 
not have had something to say regarding each code or its corresponding theme, the comments of 
all the respondents have been grouped. Where possible, this research has provided comments 
from both state board members and local school board presidents. 
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6.1.1 Autonomy, Local Control, and Independence 
These terms, as a theme, collectively describe a notion of freedom from state involvement in 
matters of local interest to school boards. This theme presents itself most strongly among the 
comments made by local school board presidents and indicates a strong interest in retaining the 
administrative concept of local control. Autonomy in political terms is generally defined as the 
right of a locality to self-govern. In this research, that meaning is retained and generally 
describes a local school district’s desire for freedom from state mandates. 
…I think the [state would] be better served to just provide funding-I mean I know you 
can’t provide un-you know, funding-I don’t think it’s that realistic for them to say, 
‘Here’s money to buy computers.’  But on the other hand, I think sometimes there’s too 
much-too many strings attached, too much micromanagement by the state that-and I 
know from talking to our administrators, they have to file so many reports, whether it’s a-
I mean they spend a lot of their time just filling out reports… I think that, uh, I think they 
say they make a commitment to education but I think they’d be better served to listen to 
the local districts a little more, then try to go from the ground-up rather than from the top-
down.  I don’t think that works very effectively… I think that the-what we have to do is 
get back to the local districts and figure out what could each individual district-are they 
economically viable?  Are their test scores meeting AYP?  Which our district is.  Our 
district is economically viable but we have a small district.  So, leave them alone.  I 
mean…” (A Local PA School District President) 
The concept of local control is closely aligned to autonomy in that it describes a 
condition wherein the citizens of a locality retain the authority to make decisions at a local 
governmental level. For purposes of this research, the local governmental agency is the school 
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district and the governing authority is the elected school board. Local control also describes the 
administrative state of making autonomous governmental decisions at the most local level.  
In this research, independence has come to mean freedom from state level involvement in 
the administrative affairs of local school districts. In this respect, it is strongly correlated to the 
concept of autonomy, however its use by local school board presidents in this research at times 
seems to also indicate the additional concept of sovereignty from other local school districts. It is 
also used, as in the above quotation, to indicate a desire to be free of mandates from the state as 
well as comparisons to neighboring or demographically similar school districts.    
6.1.2 Centralization, Standardization, and Oversight 
These three terms together describe an effort to create an efficient and universal means for 
administering education on a statewide level. The theme itself presents most strongly in the 
comments of state board of education members in response to efforts to comply with the 
provisions of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Oversight is simply regulatory 
supervision by a governmental body. In the research presented here, oversight has also come to 
mean the hand of government or governmental action. Centralization is the removal of local 
decision making capacity to a higher level. It is characterized here by the increased involvement 
of state level education agencies in the administration of local school districts through the use of 
statewide mandates. These mandates circumscribe the authority of the local school board as they 
require all local boards to submit to the authority of the state.   
[With regard to NCLB and standards]… “Now, I think for the most part we do that [with 
districts in Pennsylvania], but maybe there were a few people that we weren’t paying as 
much attention to as we should have, and we do now.  But some of [the standards] are 
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stupid.  It’s just like, it’s just like centralizing anything.  You make the rules for the vast 
majority of people, and you make the rules for maybe the big urban districts where 
they’re really struggling.  But those rules aren’t really necessary for a lot of districts, and 
all you do is… it becomes paperwork and, you know, ridiculous rules” (PA State Board 
of Education Member) 
Standardization is the removal of autonomous decision making capacity by a higher 
authority through the issuance of standards designed to unify policymaking throughout all 
constituent parts. As used in this research, standardization describes the homogenization of 
curriculum and administrative decisions that have been traditionally made independently at the 
local district level to the statewide standards through the use of statewide mandates. This is 
typified in statements by a local PA school district president such as “I do think that there’s been 
a tendency to impose from the top-down, policies and educational directions.” Whereas 
centralization describes the removal of local decision making capacity to a higher level, 
standardization describes a process whose goal is to make decision making uniform at all levels. 
They are therefore inextricably linked as the presence of one generally indicates the presence of 
the other.  
6.1.3 Authority, Influence, and Power 
These three terms together describe who or what has control over the state policymaking 
apparatus as it relates to education. The theme itself presents most strongly in the description of 
authority and power over education policy making in Pennsylvania. The school board presidents’ 
descriptions of the state  policymaking apparatus portray a notion of it being monolithic in nature 
with PDE, and the Governor to a less extent, as the face of the beast. “[Interviewer Question] Is 
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it - in your mind are you differentiating between the state board the Governor, and PDE? Or are 
they one kind of…? PDE, in our mind, they’re both, because one’s feeding off the other.” State 
board members present a more nuanced picture of authority and power where shared governance 
is paramount in making policy.  
Well, I think we have - that has to be a very close working relationship. The way it’s 
designed in the Commonwealth is sort of checks and balances. We try to listen to it, make 
sure that we have, hopefully, a similar vision on how we move this agenda forward… 
Some people have very strong opinions that [the State Board of Education] should be 
totally independent of the Department of Ed… I think we have to work together.  I think 
collaboration is the best way to move the rock - failure - out of the way for a lot of kids.  
So they get to work with the PDE, because all their regs, ultimately, pass through us… 
Actually, what I think is unique about it, it’s really, it’s a shared governance. It’s 
designed so that really no one group or individual can turn this place around on a dime 
that you have to have consensus building. You’ve got to have participation of the 
different levels of government. And when you have that and people see the benefit, 
you’re probably going to get moving. If you don’t, you’re probably not going to see any 
movement. (PA State Board of Education Member) 
Authority is the legal right to be in command. As it is used in this research, authority 
generally defines who has the statutory and constitutional control (de jure) over schools in 
Pennsylvania. Authority in this matter is widely divided, with various aspects of governance 
delegated to different parts of the state government through constitutional and statutory mandate. 
It is therefore closely aligned with the concepts of power and influence. As used by several of the 
respondents, authority may even take into consideration de facto authority, thus moving its 
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meaning even closer to that of power and influence. Traditionally, local school districts have 
been seen as the primary de jure authority in Pennsylvania education with the state board of 
education acting in an advisory or complimentary capacity.  
Influence is the political control of a body irrespective of de jure authority. It is therefore 
the result of de facto authority. In the case of Pennsylvania education, many groups and 
individuals maintain high levels of influence over the  creation of educational policy. Examples 
include the Governor, unions, lobbying organizations such as Pennsylvania School Boards 
Association, parent’s groups, and other civic organizations. They have access to policymaking 
only so far as those with de jure authority will allow them, thus creating a political debate over 
the administration of schools in the state.   
“And the way it’s set up in the Commonwealth, the secretary of Ed really reports to the 
governor and has to get everything approved through the legislature, state board, et 
cetera.  So the real quote - if there’s any authority - is the power of persuasion.  You use 
it as an opportunity to put your agenda, argue for your agenda, help set the agenda, move 
that agenda forward.  So the real authority or impact is can you promote an agenda? And 
that’s the real authority.” (PA State Board of Education Member) 
Power is control irrespective of de facto and de jure authority. Therefore, power is the 
representation of who or what ultimately has the capacity to make changes in the system. 
Authority and influence are closely tied concepts because each is a constituent of power. Among 
those who were interviewed for this research, the three terms are used in a highly 
interchangeable fashion, although it appears that power and authority retain a closer association 
in meaning.     
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6.1.4 Delegation and Deference 
Together these terms denote a theme describing the transfer of authority and influence from a 
principal to an agent. Each describes a subtle difference in how the transfer of that authority 
occurs between parties. Each can be present at the same time. The concepts present themselves 
most strongly in the comments of local school board presidents when quizzed on the relationship 
between their board and the state board of education or the department of education. Typical 
statements from PA school district presidents include, “I would say we have very little direct 
interaction with the state board and the Department of Ed, other than through our 
administration.” 
Delegation is maintaining control over how authority is used when appointing or hiring 
an assistant (an agent) in the exercise of personally held authority and influence. By delegating, 
the principal is retaining a strong influence and oversight over the exercise of their authority by 
the agent. It differs from deference in this research as it is often mandated by law and represents 
a controlled and positive transfer of independent authority. An example of this would be the 
hiring of a district superintendent to oversee the day-to-day administrative operations of the 
school district with strong school board oversight. While the hiring of a superintendent is a legal 
requirement in Pennsylvania, it also represents a delegation of administrative authority, as the 
school board remains the administrative authority under the law. 
“…we may write letters… drafts from the superintendent based on drafts that he gets 
from other school boards that have written letters or other resolutions and that type of 
thing.  But we very rarely, on our board, draft anything original.” (A Local PA School 
District President) 
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“I think it is essential that the board president and the superintendent and the business 
manager work as a team to make sure that the board is informed about issues that they 
need to know about, and that there’s a communication between the administration and the 
rest of the board” (A Local PA School District President) 
“I run the board, the xxxxx years that I’ve been board president more on a corporate 
level.  We don’t get involved with the day-to-day minutiae, the day-to-day stuff that other 
school board members think they should be involved with.  But we more or less let our 
superintendent run the school district.” (A Local PA School District President) 
Deference is foregoing control over the exercise of authority and influence when hiring 
an assistant (an agent). By deferring, the principal is relying on an agent to oversee the exercise 
of their personally held authority and influence. Deference is never required by law as there is no 
occasion where the law requires an individual to transfer authority without maintaining oversight 
over that authority. While to some this type of relationship may represent trust in the capacities 
of those who are hired, it also represents an uncontrolled and unmonitored transfer of authority. 
It differs from delegation in that there is a “hands-off” approach to the use of personally held 
authority and influence. This theme also has an underlying notion that the comments it represents 
in this research also tend to strongly represent a “buck-passing” mentality among educational 
leaders.  
“I mean I’m not an educational expert, but I’m not so sure that what the [Pennsylvania 
System of School Assessment] is focusing on is actually what maybe completely we 
should be worrying about to prepare our kids for the future, future jobs, things like that.  I 
mean, I don’t know.  I mean I listen to our superintendent and I talk to them and I know 
there’s a lot of controversy about it” (A Local PA School District President) 
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“I am definitely not a micromanager.  That’s-and I, as president, I’ve consistently 
adopted that approach.  I think overall our board, over the years that I’ve been on the 
board anyway, has adopted that general approach, that our approach is listen we hire the 
best possible administrators we can hire, we give them the general direction we want the 
district to move in, and we have to rely upon them… to me, that’s the key is hiring the 
right person” (A Local PA School District President) 
While it is common for those in positions of authority to delegate or share that authority 
with others, the authority and influence still lies with the principal, not the agent. Delegation, 
with its oversight and monitoring of the uses of authority, is therefore a positive trait in any 
relationship where the transfer of authority has occurred. Engaging in a transfer of authority 
without maintaining oversight, or deference, can be problematic for those whose authority is 
being used. In theory, deference has the strong potential to lead to the information asymmetries 
between the principal and agent as previously described. In practice, deference has the potential 
to leave the school board president, department of education official, or state board member 
looking as though they are uninformed, or worse, what might be construed as peddling influence.   
6.1.4.1 The Special Nature of Delegation and Deference as a Theme  
As previously noted, Delegation and Deference has a different origin than the other themes 
discussed and utilized in this research. No one interviewed mentioned their “deference” to the 
superintendent or characterized the manner in which they “delegated” to the superintendent. 
Instead, this theme finds its base in the actions and attitudes demonstrated by the comments of 
those interviewed. As it is formed in the actions described by the codes of other themes, it is 
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highly interrelated with the other themes as demonstrated in Figure 2. Similar versions of this 
type of highly interconnected, yet distinct, characterization can be found in other work and help 
to add clarity to the unique nature of this theme in this research. 
      A 1975 National School Boards Association report contains research by William 
Boyd and by Frank Lutz where characterizations about school board attitudes and behaviors are 
discussed in a similar fashion to the theme of “Delegation and Deference” presented in this 
research. In that 1975 study, Boyd described individual school board members as taking on 
either a “trustee” or “delegate” attitude while serving on a board. As a trustee, the board 
member’s attitude is that of being a servant of the public interest or general welfare. Thus, their 
role is to oversee the schools but not necessarily run the schools. This is similar to the deference 
position described in this research, although deference in this context indicates a willing 
abandonment of responsibility to another authority. In displaying a delegate attitude, Boyd 
argues that board members are more likely to become invested in interest groups or particular 
areas of the board’s agenda. Thus, they are more likely to remain involved in the oversight of 
those areas of interest to them. This is similar to the delegation role described in this research as 
these board members remain active participants in the function of the school.  
In the same 1975 study, Lutz describes overall school board behaviors in a fashion 
similar to Boyd. However, Lutz terms them “elite” and “arena” councils. Like Boyd’s term of 
“trustee” and the research presented here on deference, Lutz’s elite council type school board is 
one that oversees the running of the schools, but makes their decisions with the belief that it is in 
the public interest. There is, however, an underlying notion of disconnection from the will of the 
public at large. Arena councils, in contrast, are more likely to display delegation as they tend to 
contain more diverse representation from the community. As such, in theory, they are more 
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connected to the people they represent. However, there is also more special and individual 
interest represented and thus an inherent susceptibility to agenda politics and hijacking. As in 
any situation where delegation is displayed, oversight necessarily remains high in this 
environment as the interests of the board members prompt close monitoring of board activities.  
The behavior and relationship of the school board and superintendent are also  discussed 
in Board or Superintendent: Who Runs the Schools? (ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational 
Management, 1981). In that paper, a 1976 article by Boyd (Boyd, 1976b) and a 1974 book by 
Zeigler and Jennings (with Peak) are compared. For their part, Zeigler and Jennings argue that 
boards are in possession of many authority resources, but fail to use them, either because they 
don’t understand their power or they see their role as dealing with community relations. This is 
very similar to what Boyd and Lutz had previously described with their respective “trustee” and 
“elite council” terms, but adds the idea that a lack of understanding of authority may also be at 
play during deference. Zeigler and Jennings go on to say that the board will take command of 
issues that are deemed “public” and, thus, seen as the proper role of the board, such as school 
construction. They tend to pass the “internal” day-to-day administrative issues to the 
superintendent as they are perceived to properly fall into their domain. This falls very closely in 
line to the “Delegation and Deference” theme presented in this research and makes a strong case 
for that theme to be closely associated with the theme of Authority, Influence, and Power. In 
essence, according to Jennings and Zeigler, the lay board remain overly passive in the 
administration of the district, even on issues which are clearly in their jurisdiction, when 
confronted by expertise of the superintendent. They go on to argue that, “school boards should 
govern or be abolished.” 
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6.2 INTERACTION OF THE THEMES: HOW THINGS WORK IN PA 
EDUCATION 
6.2.1 Interaction of Themes and Code 
 
Figure 2 shows the individual codes grouped by theme and positioned to form intersecting 
triangles. The interaction of the various codes, as well as the theme to which they belong, are 
detailed by an interconnecting line. The more lines that point to an individual code, the more the 
concept of that code is represented in the comments of the individuals interviewed. For example, 
oversight has six lines pointing to it while autonomy has two. This indicates that those 
interviewed exemplified the concept of oversight more often than autonomy in their comments. 
The actual number of times that the concept of that code appears in the comments of those 
interviewed is represented by the first number that appears after the code. In the case of the 
example below, oversight appears 70 times while autonomy appears 23 times. 
Each line also shows the connection between two codes and therefore represents a 
connection of two concepts. The more lines that connect two concepts, the more times those 
concepts are connected in the comments of those interviewed. Oversight is connected to 
delegation, deference, power, authority, centralization, and standardization which indicates that 
these six codes are highly interconnected in the comments of those interviewed. It also shows 
that the theme of Centralization, Standardization, and Oversight is highly interconnected to 
Authority, Influence, and Power. Autonomy is connected only to independence and local control, 
which shows a low level of interconnectivity for that code as well as that theme.  
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The actual number of times that the code is connected to another code is represented by 
the second number that appears after the code. In the case of the example below, oversight is 
connected six times, while autonomy only has two connections. By adding the number of 
connections (the second number) for each code of a theme, the level of interconnectivity between 
themes becomes more apparent. For example, Centralization, Standardization, and Oversight 
have a total number of connections of 11, while Authority, Influence, and Power have a total 
number of connections of 16. Thus, the theme of Authority, Influence, and Power has a higher 
level of interconnectivity among all themes than does Centralization, Standardization, and 
Oversight. Table 6 shows the levels of interconnectivity among themes. 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of Themes and Codes 
Table 6. Levels of Interconnectivity Among Themes 
Centralization, Standardization, and 
Oversight 
11 Delegation and Deference 10 
Authority, Influence, and Power 16 Autonomy, Local Control, and Independence 9 
 
 The theme of Delegation and Deference requires a special note. As previously described, 
this theme was created after the sorting of comments under the codes. No one interviewed for 
this project described their activities in terms of these codes. The codes were derived to explain 
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the actions of those interviewed by the researcher. Therefore they have no number indicating 
their appearance in the comments of those interviewed. They do, however, have a number 
indicating their interconnectivity to other codes and themes. This is the result of the concepts of 
delegation and deference being born in the actions discussed and exemplified by the comments 
relating to other codes. 
6.2.2 How Things Work In PA Education 
The comments made by all respondents on each of these themes give the impression that local 
school boards still retain the bulk of authority in the state, but that status is in flux. While the 
legal requirements of the federal No Child Left Behind legislation have certainly changed what 
tasks the local districts are responsible to perform, the comments support a notion that PA has 
managed to retain a system of autonomous local control over education with regard to those 
tasks.  
“I think probably [districts are losing local control], I think if they’ve lost 
anything at all, it’s just what the targets are.  But how you get to the targets, who you hire 
to get to the targets, how you fund for the targets, everything else is still local control.”- 
PA State Board of Education Member 
…“And I think what we’re seeing is a slow erosion of the authority of local 
school boards.”- A Local PA School District President 
Further, the comments lead one to believe that the local school boards retain a high 
amount of autonomy from both other districts and state level actions especially if they possess 
independent financial means to pay for additional programming. This autonomy manifests itself 
most directly as resistance to state mandates and directives.  
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“And we’ve probably been more fortunate than other school boards because we 
have financial resources so we can do enough to meet the standards that they set, so that 
whatever central authority that there is really doesn’t impede us or impact us all that 
much.  Whereas some school districts, because they don’t-because they get the majority 
of their money from the state, and because they don’t have some other resources to be 
able to go and do curriculum work, or instructional work, or in-servicing with their 
teachers, they bear the brunt of what’s going on.”- A Local PA School District President 
“Yeah, we pretty much do that.  But we can do that because we have financial 
resources, and because, frankly, they can’t breathe down our necks too much because our 
results are good.  And that’s part of why we wanted to make sure that those results would 
be good, so we wouldn’t have them breathing down our neck over silly things.”- A Local 
PA School District President 
Although oversight by the state has surely increased, centralization, as defined in this 
research, is not occurring in Pennsylvania with regard to the state actively taking authority away 
from the local districts. Those interviewed feel that there is no active policy trend of the state 
removing power from local districts nor is there pressure from the federal government to force 
such a change. Centralization is, however, occurring by default when districts are unable to meet 
the federal standards and the state is forced to intervene with additional funds or more drastic 
administrative measures such as a “takeover.”  
“But actually how it’s done, I mean that’s - they set the target, but the other 90 
percent of the let’s say design and development is left up to local boards.  So if you’ve 
got a board that’s more interested in hiring cousin Louie than they are in making sure that 
every kid has the resources and support they need, the odds are that district’s not going to 
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do very well.  So local boards still have a tremendous authority in terms of the funding, 
the budget, the hiring, professional development, et cetera.  The one thing is they - it’s no 
longer just left up to them to take the district anywhere it wants to go without any 
consequence.  So the only sic that’s changed is now there’s some consequences.  You’ve 
got to show that you’re still an educational institution; you’re not just a political 
institution.”- A Local PA School District President 
“I’m not sure that I think it’s centralization so much at the state level as, No Child 
Left Behind has centralized this thing at the federal level.”- A Local PA School District 
President 
The statements of those interviewed point to more of a trend towards standardization 
which has clearly been the effect of No Child Left Behind on the PA educational system.  
“I think a basic standard is good for the schools”- PA State Board of Education 
Member 
“Well as far as the Pennsylvania standards, I think that’s a positive, because I 
think there are some schools that far exceed that.  But there are other small, rural schools 
that don’t know how to get there… So even though you think it’s going to be centralized, 
the school districts pretty much do what they’re capable of doing with what they have.”- 
PA State Board of Education Member 
“Well I think the reality is, and what we’ve seen, is that it’s NCLB that’s driving 
the bus, because the bottom line education like any industry, what you measure is what 
you make. So NCLB didn’t have the money, didn’t have - it had the teeth, because if you 
don’t make AYP, they take you over. So the bottom line is you know respect the old 
business cliché, ‘you respect what you inspect’. So they’re inspecting this; you better 
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believe everybody’s respecting it. So there’s a real, a real driver here is NCLB with its 
AYP”- PA State Board of Education Member 
While districts, and the school boards who oversee them, are obviously constrained by 
the emergence of standards and mandates they have been given, they are also currently given 
wide latitude in administering those mandates. Therefore, while standardization of policy from 
the Department of Education is certainly occurring across the school districts, centralization is 
not. 
As noted in previous chapters, there is a description of authority in PA education where it 
is widely shared among several state agencies (PDE, the State Board, School Districts, Attorney 
General, the Legislature, and the Auditor General) with input from concerned civic groups which 
the comments of those interviewed would also support. While this vision of shared authority 
over education is probably a bit overstated, particularly by those who serve on the state board of 
education, chapter 2 of this research shows that there is clearly a legal requirement for input from 
multiple sources inside the state government. It therefore cannot be ignored that there are 
powerful forces that, while currently not conspiring to remove the hallmark of local control from 
education in Pennsylvania, could do so if the political winds change at either the state or federal 
level.      
“Actually, what I think is unique about it, it’s really, it’s a shared governance.  It’s 
designed so that really no one group or individual can turn this place around on a dime 
that you have to have consensus building.  You’ve got to have participation of the 
different levels of government.  And when you have that and people see the benefit, 
you’re probably going to get moving.  If you don’t, you’re probably not going to see any 
movement.  See the error in the Keystones, which I think are not you know the she-devil 
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that some are making them out to be, was because they’re kind of popped out of the 
container before they went around and shared with everybody what’s the purpose of this.  
How do we do this?”– Pennsylvania State Board of Education Member 
6.3 OBSERVATIONS  
Data collection for this research took the form of interviews and document analysis. As part of 
the interview process, the observations of the interviewer regarding the subject, the surroundings, 
and the validity of their statements were recorded. These observations add depth and rich context 
to the information already provided in chapter 6 and add to the validation strategies discussed in 
chapter 5.5. These observations also help to support some of the additional findings of the study 
and are the basis of at least one of the policy implications discussed in chapter 7.3. In an effort to 
better characterize the observations of the researcher, the general patterns of behavior have been 
broken into several categories for review. It is not the intent of this work to offer value 
judgments or inject the bias of the researcher into the actions engaged in by the participants. The 
opinions of the researcher have been provided as part of the findings and implications in chapter 
7. Instead, this material is provided as a catalog of additional insights as an aid to which others 
may appeal when forming their own opinions. 
6.3.1 Place and time of meeting 
The place where the interview was to occur was left to the discretion to the individual being 
interviewed. The researcher did make use of a hotel suite and its adjacent lounge for several of 
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the interviews, but use of this facility was left to the person being interviewed. When using this 
facility, there were no reportable anomalies with regard to the place of the interview. However, 
when another facility was chosen by the interview subject, a reportable variation did occur. Of 
those who agreed to participate in the study but not make use of the hotel suite, all agreed to 
meet at their place of general employment or at the district offices of their respective school 
district. In doing this, it became obvious to the researcher that the individuals were attempting to 
make use of and display their professional reputations and the facilities of their district. They 
were also allowed to control the pace and time of the meeting as it was “on their turf.” Finally, 
their awards, accolades, photographs, and mementos were clearly on display as evidence of their 
accomplishments. 
Of the several examples of this behavior, a few stand out as exemplars. In one case, the 
researcher was asked to be prompt in meeting with an official at their place of employment, but 
was then asked to wait nearly 45 minutes after the meeting was to begin. The researcher was told 
that the subject was involved in a telephone meeting with the governor and his officials. Once 
the telephone meeting had apparently concluded, the researcher continued to wait as the subject 
was continually involved in matters of apparently pressing importance. Once the researcher was 
invited into the office, the subject did not make use of a small conference room, but instead 
chose to sit at their desk surrounded by their degrees, awards, placards, and photographs with 
many influential citizens. The subject put their feet on the desk at several points during the 
interview. They further made use of their assistants to control the timeframe of the meeting.  
In another example, an official invited the researcher to their professional place of 
employment and used their executive office as a place for the meeting. While this action may not 
seem to warrant notation, it was recorded as “odd” by the researcher as they has passed several 
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open conference rooms and other employees who greeted the official as they passed on their way 
to the inner office of the official. Once in the office, it became clear to the researcher that, in 
addition to highlighting their importance in the company, the intention was to highlight the 
numerous awards and recognitions presented to the official for their work in education. The 
subject, however, was not employed in the field of education. It seemed that the display of 
affectations was designed to highlight their charitable work for professional gains. A final 
example of this behavior was noted when another official proceeded to tour the researcher 
around their school district’s facilities to highlight the significant progress the district had made 
over a period that happened to coincide with their time on the school board.  
6.3.2 Disdain 
Several of those interviewed spoke with disdain regarding the barriers to further accomplishment 
for their district such as Annual Yearly Progress goals or for developments in educational testing 
such as the upcoming Keystone examinations or the Pennsylvania Alternate System of 
Assessment. Special education in general was a topic brought up by nearly every official 
interviewed and seemed to provoke the most response from local school board presidents. One 
school board president in particular openly appeared hostile toward children with special needs, 
describing them as “expensive” and responsible for their failure to meet AYP goals. Other 
subjects of contempt were the basic concept of Annual Yearly Progress, the PA Department of 
Education and its lack of action, and the social and economic discrepancies between eastern and 
western Pennsylvania school districts.  
There were also strong feelings displayed regarding independence from neighboring 
school districts among the local school board presidents interviewed. There appeared to be a 
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consensus feeling that they are not in competition with one and other. However, they also saw 
little use in participating with each other. While not expressly stated, there did seem to be an 
underlying notion of competition as each was acutely aware of the strengths and weaknesses of 
others. Some who were interviewed went farther with this feeling and displayed open contempt 
at the poor economic or administrative state of other local districts. One went so far as to 
mention that their strong desire to remain independent of other neighboring districts was based 
on the fact that they were economically superior to their neighbors and did not want to be 
“dragged down” by their “issues”.   
6.3.3 Agendas and Public Perception 
Several of those interviewed displayed a great deal of interest in distancing themselves from a 
personal or political agenda. Further, the perception of others regarding their actions seemed to 
be of great concern. One official who was interviewed repeatedly used phrases such as “setting 
the record straight”, “setting [the researcher] straight”, and “setting others straight” indicating a 
strong awareness of public perception of their actions. In another example, one subject discussed 
at great length how apolitical they were in their beliefs. They further described their service on 
the board as being motivated only by a deep affection for their town, the needs of kids, and 
educational matters. However, at a later point in the interview, the subject wanted to discuss the 
role that party and political belief can play in education and reform which was beyond the scope 
of any question that was asked. The researcher also observed several photographs of the subject 
with prominent political and civic leaders. 
In a different twist on this issue, several subjects were very open about their deep 
political beliefs and heritage. One interview subject was delighted at the thought of being 
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portrayed as a bulwark against increased state activism in education particularly by spendthrift 
liberals. A local board president stated quite clearly that their board was, and will continue to be, 
Republican. Another president of a local board was very open about their service being tied to 
their professional and personal agenda. They admitted that their interest in service was affected 
by their deeply held personal political beliefs as well as their professional needs. However, they 
were also adamant in their belief that their stated agenda had never gotten in the way of their 
duty to properly serve their constituents.    
6.4 POTENIAL NEW THEMES 
As part of the data analysis process for this project, the researcher developed a series of 
predetermined codes which were developed into categories as part of an a priori content analysis. 
Those categories are reflected in chapter 6.1 as they were later further developed as part of the 
themes analysis presented in that section. However, as part of the interview process, the 
researcher became aware of other potential issues that were overlooked in the original 
conception of the project. One of those issues was developed further into the theme of 
Delegation and Deference as it became evident that the codes being used were incapable of 
specifically describing the actions of the respondents with regard to their use of authority. 
The initial interest of this project was based on the effect of politically charged curricular 
changes such as NCLB on the state political context in which schools in Pennsylvania operate. 
As such, two other emergent issues were overlooked at the conception of this project and during 
the development of the a priori themes. These issues are certainly beyond the scope of this 
project as it has developed. They are not supported by either the literature review or the other 
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research presented here and have not been further developed in the same way as Delegation and 
Deference. However, as they are almost omnipresent in the statements of those interviewed, it 
would be remiss to not present some comment on their existence. The intent here therefore is to 
provide a note as a basis for the potential further exploration of these issues in other research. 
In analyzing the comments of those interviewed, two unexpected areas of relevance 
developed. First, nearly all of the interview subjects, spoke in some way about their desire to 
help children as being a motivation for their participation on the state board or the local school 
board. A variation on the phrase “…for the kids…” is used by 12 of the 14 people interviewed 
for this project. The motivation for service constitutes a potential new theme which may have an 
impact on the political environment. Additional comments on this emergent theme have been 
included in chapter 7.2.2 
Second, based on the interviews conducted, fiduciary issues emerged as an area of 
interest. At the time of the interviews, local school board presidents were becoming aware of the 
underfunding of the Pennsylvania State Education Retirement System (PSERS) by the state 
legislature and the effect it may have on their future finances. This coupled with a stalled 
economy, a shrinking tax base for most, buildings in need of rehabilitation, and stalled state 
education subsidies may have contributed to the presence of this in the comments of those 
interviewed. However, this scenario is a nearly yearly occurrence for any school board director 
in Pennsylvania, thus making it a prevalent issue associated with the job. Interestingly, of the 
three financial strata of school boards interviewed, all but one made reference to district finances 
as being a primary concern, albeit for different reasons. Of the 10 local school board presidents 
interviewed for this project, 9 mentioned managing the district finances as a key component of 
their job. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
The final chapter of this dissertation starts with a brief overview of the study. The subsequent 
section presents six key findings that emerged from the data analysis. That is followed by a 
discussion of the wider relevance of these findings in the context of the principal agent 
framework. Future research and policy implications are addressed in the final two sections that 
conclude the chapter.  
7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation investigated the question of whether or not the federal No Child Left Behind 
legislation is influencing the generally autonomous relationship between local school boards and 
the state. More to the point, this qualitative study sought to examine the oversight relationship 
that exists between state level policymakers in Pennsylvania, in the form of the State Board of 
Education, and local school boards in one county. Using a single, critical case research design, 
this investigation considered the mechanisms of control that exist between the state and local 
boards. It utilized the principal agent framework in its examination, which is commonly used by 
political science, business, organizational studies, and economic scholars to study the power 
structures that exist in any bureaucracy. The dissertation topic was chosen after consideration of 
other critical examinations of the political power structures in education policy failed to identify 
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or consider the local school board as a discrete entity. It seeks to both correct this perceived 
lacking in the literature and expand upon a developing body of principal agent-based research in 
education in both its subject matter and methodology.  
The current political environment in education exerts extreme pressure on school boards 
to make decisions that both placate and adequately serve the local citizens they represent as well 
as the politicians who fund them. However, in the current educational policy environment 
created by NCLB, school boards are increasingly being isolated from the local autonomy that 
they have traditionally enjoyed. This federal legislation has done nothing directly to limit or 
increase the role of the local school boards, but it has considerably defined how states are to 
educate children by tying testing results to funding. In turn, the states have individually decided 
how to meet the federal regulations in order to receive funding. Often these efforts are combined 
with a centralization of policy to the state level to ensure uniform policy dissemination and 
adherence at the local level. In this type of system, the school boards are seen as the 
administrators of state policy at a local level. They are empowered and responsible for the 
decisions that need to be made, but often lack the authority to actually decide anything because 
policy decisions have been already made at the state level. The centralization of educational 
policy is a national trend to varying degrees in each state. As such, one could view these efforts 
as a centralization of authority to a state level and, in a de facto sense, to the federal level.   
Despite this trend and the continuation of the NCLB policy environment, little has been 
done to investigate if this centralization is occurring and what effect it is having in local school 
districts that have traditionally enjoyed high levels of local autonomy. With no formal effort to 
study school boards as discrete entities, centralization, or the effect of NCLB on local autonomy, 
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this dissertation seeks to address several gaps in the literature. Further, this study seeks to expand 
the policy literature through use of the principal agent framework as the mode of inquiry. 
Chapters 2 and 6 present the elements of a case study investigating the legal framework 
and power structures that administer education in Pennsylvania. Development of this case relied 
on an extensive review of state statutes, documents, and interview data collected from state board 
members and local school boards. The case study contains background information on each 
entity, describes the legal basis for their authority, and includes an analysis of their highly 
intertwined relationship with each other. Chapter 7 reports the key findings that emerged from 
the data analysis, discusses the implications of the findings for education policy, and presents the 
future research potential of the subject.  
7.2 FINDINGS 
Analysis of the data regarding whether NCLB is having an effect on local school board 
autonomy in Pennsylvania produced one key finding and four additional findings. These findings 
indicate common thought among policymakers on the most fundamental issues, but also point 
out disparities depending on where the respondents sit in the power structure. They also point out 
a diffuse power structure over education that was previously undescribed. By addressing the 
research question in Chapter 1 and analyzing the data in the context of the principal agent theory, 
this study was able to define a picture of the power structures in education and clarify the 
oversight relationships that exist between the state and the local school boards.  
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7.2.1 Key Finding 
There is consensus among those interviewed that the state either is currently centralizing 
authority over schools or has already done so through standardization and regulation. This 
finding is in line with the general trend of an ever increasing role for state and federal authorities 
as discussed in the review of the literature and highlighted in the work of Wirt and Kirst (1982), 
Abrams (1993), and Fusarelli and Cooper (2009). However, in an interesting turn, that fact seems 
to be of little concern to those interviewed regardless of their position. There is consensus among 
all those interviewed that despite this centralization trend, local districts are maintaining 
autonomy and local control over decision making.  
Those interviewed believe that while policy prescriptions such as state standards and 
AYP goals have been a centralizing force, the implementation and attainment of these standards 
and goals has been generally left to the local school districts. Whether this constitutes true local 
control or a de facto set of circumstances that has happened because of a diffuse bureaucracy 
remains unclear based on this research and interview responses. This finding concurs with the 
research of Henig (2009), who argues that rather than simply disappearing, local school 
government has evolved. Jennings (2003) also supports this finding by arguing that under the 
current NCLB system, all three levels of educational governance have had to take on new roles 
and responsibilities. Therefore, the authority of local districts has not diminished, but rather 
expanded to meet the needs of the modern governance system. In a related and supporting 
finding, those interviewed beleived that the state standards and AYP goals were a positive 
influence on education in Pennsylvania as they provided a baseline from which the local districts 
could measure their progress.   
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7.2.2 Additional Findings 
In addition to the key finding presented above, this study produced six additional results that 
relate to the oversight and authority enjoyed by state education policymakers. These findings 
serve to further describe the policymaking context in which education rests. 
 
1. Power over the schools is broadly distributed in several areas of state 
government.  The respondents indicated that power is not localized into the relationship between 
the State Board of Education/PDE and local school districts. Instead, it is far more broadly 
distributed with the Attorney General, Auditor General, the state board, the Governor, PDE, and 
the legislature sharing oversight over education in the Commonwealth. Each of these entities has 
a specific legal oversight role, with the exception of the Governor, whose oversight role is 
derived from their highly public position as the state’s chief administrator. This finding agrees 
with Epstein (2004) in that the power over public education in Pennsylvania rests with a highly 
diffuse web of politicians who often have no clear jurisdictional authority over education. This 
understanding of the shared relationship over educational oversight indicates that, in the context 
of the principal agent relationship, local school districts may ultimately serve as the agent for any 
number of bureaucratic structures in the state, not just the State Board of Education. It therefore 
stands to reason that any policy launched into this environment faces a difficult and uncertain 
path toward implementation. Fuhrman (2004) supports this notion by arguing that, from the 
standpoint of the principal agent relationship, educational reforms are historically limited in this 
type of diffuse environment. 
2. AYP is an issue for the local board but not the state board. The research indicates 
that state board members pay little thought to the concept of Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) 
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goals and the effect that they will have on local school districts. This is in stark contrast to local 
school board presidents in Allegheny County, who indicated that AYP goal attainment is the 
main source of interaction between their district and the state. This finding reveals a potential 
disconnect between state level policymakers and local school boards on a fundamental area of 
concern to oversight.  
3. The Pennsylvania Department of Education has no real authority. Those 
interviewed indicated that PDE lacked independence from the Governor’s office and therefore 
was predisposed to push a “party line” of educational reforms. Further, those interviewed 
indicated that PDE lacked any real authority in the governance of education in the state. Instead, 
the power of the governor and the legislature were citied as the only true authority over 
education that existed in Pennsylvania. This finding is instructive as both of these entities have 
devolved their de jure authority over education to others, yet still retain a significant amount of 
de facto authority to be perceived as the major sources of power in statewide educational 
policymaking. It is, however, at odds with Fuhrman’s (1989) findings that Pennsylvania has a 
“reactive” legislature with little direct involvement with education.   
4. There is consensus that the State Board of Education should be more independent 
of PDE. Local school board presidents indicated a perception that the state board was nothing 
more than a conduit for PDE policy given their close ties. State board members indicated a desire 
to function more independently of PDE and/or the legislature and/or the Governor, but lacked the 
legal or financial basis to do so. All those interviewed indicated that more autonomy from other 
oversight entities was needed for the state board, but particularly from PDE. This indicates that 
the body charged with ultimately overseeing the dispersal and maintenance of educational policy 
in the state (PDE) does their job from a highly insulated and centralized position inside the state 
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bureaucracy. It also calls into question their ability to act independently of the political 
machinations of state politicians.  
5. School Boards have lost their purpose. School boards, as they are constituted today, 
are the product of a localized system initially constituted in the 18th century. According to Tyack 
and Cuban (1995), at their heart, they are designed to be reflective of the local citizens and their 
values and responsive to the needs of the local economy. However, according to Wirt and Kirst 
(1982), Kirst (1988), and Cuban (2004), as the state increasingly moves to centralize control over 
school districts, the purpose of the school board becomes less clear. No longer do they have the 
influence that they once enjoyed over what is taught in the district. Further, as discussed in 
chapter 6, as boards increasingly defer and delegate to their administrators, they make their 
purpose almost obsolete. If curricular dictates and standards are being passed down from the 
state level and those dictates and standards are being implemented by the local administrators, at 
the behest of the local school board, what then is the purpose of the local board but to hire the 
administrators? 
6. Board members serve for a multitude of reasons, but “for the kids” is probably 
the least of them. With regard to the potential emergent theme discussed in chapter 6.4, state 
board members and local board presidents serve in their capacities to further political and 
legislative agendas that are both personal and professional in nature. As evinced in chapter 6.4, 
each member will talk of “the kids” and doing what is right “for the kids” but the nature of and 
reasons for serving on these boards often collides with the best interest of “the kids”. Several 
examples of these kinds of individuals and their actions are discussed in chapter 6.3. Further, 
“for the kids” sounds a lot better in public than “for the property taxes”, “for the football team” 
or “for the party” which may underlie their true reasons for desiring to serve.  
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7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The State Board of Education is a highly insulated entity whose members are not elected but 
appointed. It serves, in conjunction with PDE and the legislature, to disseminate rules that 
govern the educational policies of the state. The state board is highly enmeshed with the 
governor. They serve at his pleasure and are nominated by him. They are also highly enmeshed 
with PDE. The secretary serves as a board member and PDE performs all of their research 
functions. In constituting the role of the state board in the statewide educational policy 
bureaucracy, it would appear that they are the agent to the governor/PDE’s principal. Despite 
being the principal to the local district’s agent, oversight of the state board on local school 
districts is non-existent. They have no legislative, administrative, regulatory, or financial 
authority over the school districts. Whatever decisions they make, either need the approval of or 
can be challenged by the legislature. They do not make or enforce the rules under which the 
districts operate. They, therefore, have no direct punitive power over the districts which further 
damages their authority.  
PDE also lacks any clear direct oversight authority over local districts. It has highly 
circumspect power regarding the enforcement of statutes regarding education. Like the state 
board, it also has no financial oversight over the local school districts. Its authority is limited to 
helping districts implement statewide policy and monitoring the implementation of that policy. 
Despite devolving administrative control over schools to the state board through legal decree, the 
legislature, in conjunction with the Auditor General and Attorney General in certain matters, 
retains the ultimate authority over local school districts. All recommendations passed by the state 
board must also be approved by the legislature. They retain the sole funding authority over 
education for the state. They pass laws which are then charged to be implemented by PDE. As 
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such, they retain the ultimate oversight authority over schools in the state, but have devolved the 
day-to-day operation to other statewide agencies.     
Further the state board, and the local boards to a lesser extent, represent an opportunity 
for unregulated lobbying and agenda oriented politics. On the state board, each member 
represents a political appointment and therefore, either directly or indirectly, a political agenda. 
Further, many members of the state board of education also serve as directors, advocates, 
lobbyists, and champions of particular interest groups in the field of education. While on the 
surface it may appear that the inclusion of professional education persons would be a boon to 
educational policymaking, in fact, it exposes the agenda and business of the board to several 
issues of concern.  
First, the inclusion of professional education persons has the potential of subjecting the 
board to lobbying by its own members. While there is nothing inherently illegal about this 
practice, it does leave the decisions of the board subject to wide criticism on the basis of 
cronyism and weakens the appearance and authority of the board. Second, it adds the increased 
potential of direct conflicts of interest between board members and those who have business with 
the board or the state. As policy increasingly centralizes to PDE and the state board, it stands to 
reason that decisions regarding appropriate textbook selection, instructional delivery techniques, 
outside district management consultants, charter school administration, and other costly 
measures may also come under review by the state board. Currently, there is nothing in place to 
safeguard the public or its finances from the influence of board members who may also have ties 
to textbook publishers, consultants, or grant and funding seekers. 
Local board presidents are less susceptible to the influences of internal lobbying and 
conflicts of interests because their particular spheres of influence, with the exception of 
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Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, are rather small. There is little to be gained by internally lobbying 
one school district. However, the personal machinations of those who serve on these boards can 
be a cause for concern. While there surely are many individuals who serve their local school 
districts simply out of civic pride, there surely are also many who serve as a professional or 
political stepping stone. The motives and the effect that these individuals have on the educational 
quality of the local school district should rightly be questioned. 
7.3.1 Policy and Oversight Revisions 
1. The research presented here indicates that there is a strong sense of collusion between the 
State Board of Education, the Governor’s office, and the Pennsylvania Department of Education 
among both state board members as well as the local school board presidents who were 
interviewed. There is a perceived need to better define the roles of these institutions in the 
educational policy process among local school board presidents. Further, the function of the state 
board and its legal mandate to remain independent, yet intertwined, to the Governor and 
Department of Education needs to be worked out in the law. State board members should either 
be elected directly by the people or be appointed by both the legislature and Governor’s office. 
Granting the state board discrete funding from the state coffers to perform research, hold 
hearings and meetings, make grant awards, and perform their function would also greatly 
improve their own independence. 
2. Local school boards should be disbanded as they have become an increasingly 
anachronistic mechanism of oversight in educational policymaking. As (Jennings and Zeigler 
with Peak, 1974) argue “school boards should govern or be abolished.” The authority over 
school districts should be transferred directly to district superintendents, who would be directly 
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employed by PDE and the Secretary of Education with a mandate from the state legislature. This 
would give the superintendents greater authority and make them both directly responsible and 
accountable for the performance of their district. Eliminating the board shortens the path of 
oversight and strengthens the opportunity for communication between principal (PDE) and agent 
(the local district).  
School boards already appear to perform many redundant functions that are increasingly 
being centralized to the state or have been delegated to district administration. The functions of 
the school board, as evinced by the comments presented here, clearly show a pattern of deference 
or delegation to superintendents on the part of school board presidents. Board presidents admit 
that the best thing that they can do in their job is to hire “good people.” Despite the law, in this 
research, school board presidents do not appear to actively run their districts. They transfer that 
authority to their agent. Ironically, in doing so they weaken their reason for existing. Their 
purpose beyond hiring and firing administrators and faculty is therefore not readily apparent. 
Local school boards do serve a purpose in allowing local citizens an avenue to air 
grievances and concerns regarding the school. However, that function of the board is often little 
used by the local citizens and could be performed by another elected official such as the local 
member of the state House of Representatives, the state Senator, or both. As previously stated, 
the General Assembly ultimately has the oversight authority over schools in the state. By moving 
this function to members of the state House and the Senate, the lines of communication and 
oversight between the principal (the General Assembly) and the agent (the local district) are 
strengthened.   
3. In a fashion similar to other public officials, Pennsylvania state board members, local 
board members, and superintendents should be required to publically report any contact that they 
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have with lobbyists and the context in which it occurs. Individuals in this category should 
include representatives of those who have a business or curricular interest with their board or 
district. Further, those with a previous history of direct lobbying for interest groups or 
corporations with educational agendas or products should be barred from serving on the state 
board of education as the positions are currently appointed. Local citizens should retain the right 
to elect whomever they desire to serve on their local school board.  
While there is nothing to indicate that the system is currently rampant with corruption or 
influence peddling, there are clearly areas where a position on a board could make for a potential 
conflict of interest. By requiring reporting, the motivations of why individuals serve on these 
boards could become clearer. With the corporate interests of textbook publishers, charter 
schools, political or social interest groups, and others becoming increasingly savvy and 
organized at every level of educational politics, it makes sense to increase transparency before 
there is a problem with corruption. By requiring reporting of contact now, the potential for 
impropriety becomes greatly reduced in the future. 
7.4 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
1. As previously noted, the research presented here intentionally does not consider a 
geographically diverse portion of state and local policymakers. Further, as this study was limited 
in scope to one county, it was also unable to consider important internal factors that exist in 
Pennsylvania at-large that may have had an effect on the findings overall. These factors include, 
but are not limited to, issues such as the marked economic disparity between western and eastern 
PA school districts, regional and sub-regional variations in political beliefs, and sub-regional 
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ethnic and cultural variations. Any or all of these factors could affect the responses given by 
local school board presidents. Therefore, a broader assessment of Pennsylvania as a whole is 
indicated. By including more school districts from the state’s highly disparate regions, the 
potential effect of these factors could be included in the research. This would yield observations 
and policy prescriptions that are far more defensible on a statewide basis. 
2. School district size is a factor in any school system that retains a strong local 
autonomy. Although Pennsylvania has consolidated hundreds of school districts since the 1960s, 
the emphasis has remained on local community representation by limiting the geographic scale 
of the districts in the state to the sub-county level. However, other states have constituted their 
local systems with an emphasis on the geographic bounds of the county delineating the local 
school system. The role these larger, wealthier, and potentially more diverse districts play in the 
oversight relationship between state and local officials is a source of further study. These effects 
may be augmented or altered in states that use large countywide districts that still retain strong 
local authority, such as Maryland or Virginia, and may yield contrasting results when compared 
to other models of school districts that retain strong local control. 
3. The political environment of the state also plays a role in the relationships that exist in 
the educational system in the state. Pennsylvania has a notoriously closed state legislature, that 
often votes in secret, and a governor that is imbued with very broad appointment and executive 
decision authority. Further, the state has traditionally avoided the broad use of statewide 
referenda to decide issues of broad appeal, instead leaving that function to the state legislature. 
The relatively closed nature of democratic politics in the state has bred a system which thrives on 
networks and influence among politicians. As this study looks at the nature of political 
relationships, the results are likely highly influenced by the political environment. Conducting a 
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similar study, in a state where authority and influence are constituted or diffused in different 
patterns, would likely lead to results that could make the basis for a comparative study. Also, 
running this study in a state with more open access to the democratic structures of government, 
like California and its broad use of statewide referenda, could significantly sway the outcome of 
the study. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL AND DISCLOSURE 
Interview Protocol 
Interview Time: 20 to 30 minutes (although there is no set time limit) 
Interviewer: Joseph Dietrich 
 
The following protocol is a general guideline for conducting the interview. A semi-
structured process was chosen to allow for a discussion between the interviewer and participant. 
The protocol is designed to ensure that the discussion covers the primary area of interest, the 
relationship between the state board of education and local school boards, yet allows for in depth 
questioning based on the responses of the participant.  
 
Participant Selection 
All participants will have been contacted previously via a letter of request for an 
interview and a follow up contact. Potential participants who will receive this letter will have 
been pre-selected based on the criteria outlined in the Participant Selection section of the 
Dissertation Overview document.  
 
Research Disclosure 
Prior to the interview, each participant will be given a disclosure statement to review. The 
form will outline the interview timeframe, the subjects to be covered during the interview, and 
will contain a statement of confidentiality. It will also contain a statement regarding the 
recording of the interview.  
 
Questions 
l. In what manner does your position require you to directly interact with the state board  
of education and PDE/local school boards? 
 
2. How would you characterize the state government's view of public education? Local  
school boards? 
 
3. How would you define the relationship between the state board\PDE and local school  
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boards? Has the presence of NCLB had an effect on the relationship? How?   
 
4. If the state board and PDE are able to control the actions of local school boards how do  
they accomplish this? 
 
5. Can you think of any times when your board may have altered its actions because of  
a potential conflict with the state/local school boards? 
 
6. What oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that local school boards are  
responsive to state board and PDE directives? 
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Participant Research Disclosure  
 
Title: The Effect of NCLB on State Board and Local School Board Relations: A Pennsylvania 
Example 
 
Please review the following document pertaining to your participation in this study. If you 
have any questions, the interviewer will answer them. Once you have read and understand 
it fully, the interview will begin. 
 
Timeframe: The interview is designed to be completed in 20-30 minutes although participants 
may utilize as much time as they wish. 
 
Subject of Interview: The interview will ask questions regarding the relationship between the 
State Board of Education and district school boards. Of particular interest will be the effect 
NCLB has had on the relationship. 
 
Confidentiality: All data gathered from participants will remain confidential. The identity of 
participants will not be used in the research analysis and all participants will remain anonymous. 
At no time will the identity of the participant be linked to the recording, transcript, or interview 
notes that result from the interview. All interview recordings and transcripts will be given a 
random code. There will be no way to identify the participant of each interview. Any data, 
interviews, transcripts, consent forms, or research notes will be kept by the researcher under lock 
and at no time will they be made public.      
 
Right to Record: By participating in this research, you are agreeing to be recorded being 
interviewed for research purposes. These recordings will remain confidential, anonymous, and 
under the control of the researcher. They will not be made public.  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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